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The New Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy
Code: A Step Toward Erosion of
National Sovereignty
John J. Chung*
I. INTRODUCTION
The reform of the Bankruptcy Code, pursuant to the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (the
"Act"), has attracted much attention due to the dramatic reform of
bankruptcy law relating to individual debtors under Chapters 7 and 13.
Much less attention has been paid to the landmark introduction of the new
Chapter 15 under the Act. Chapter 15 governs transnational bankruptcies.
It applies in every bankruptcy of a multinational corporation that is an
American corporation or a foreign corporation with assets or operations in
the United States.
According to its proponents, this new structure was long overdue in
light of the increasingly global nature of economic activity and the reach of
multinational companies. The push for internationalization has been
provided by a group of international legal scholars, judges and lawyers,
whose efforts were instrumental to the enactment of Chapter 15. They
describe Chapter 15 as a means to promote global economic activity and
growth and a needed device to enable different courts around the world to
communicate and cooperate with each other in the administration of a
bankrupt estate with assets and creditors in different countries. Such
admirable goals are difficult to quibble with, and Congress enacted Chapter
15 in the spirit of economic growth and global cooperation.
'Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A. 1982, Washington
University (St. Louis); J.D. 1985, Harvard Law School. The author was a long-time resident
of Geneva, Switzerland, where this article was written. The author wishes to thank Fred
Tung for his generosity in sharing his thoughts. The author also wishes to thank Lynn
LoPucki for his thoughts and comments on an earlier draft, which were invaluable in
refining the analysis. This article would not have been possible without the foundation of
Professor LoPucki's scholarship. Any error is, of course, mine.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:89 (2006)
At first glance, Chapter 15 seems harmless enough, with its emphasis
on international cooperation and communication. Few would object to such
benign goals. The reality, however, is that Chapter 15 is more than a device
to promote cooperation. In their most restrained interpretation, its backers
view it as a vehicle to push the United States toward a universalist approach
to transnational bankruptcies. So what. is this universalism? Universalism,
in short, is about one court in one country taking control of a multinational
bankruptcy and applying its domestic bankruptcy law to all of the debtor's
assets and creditors worldwide. Chapter 15 moves in that direction by,
among other things, requiring an American court to defer to the jurisdiction
of a foreign bankruptcy proceeding under certain circumstances.
So what is wrong with universalism? Its supporters claim that it is an
inevitable and desirable outgrowth of and catalyst to global economic
growth. However, at its heart, universalism is about the displacement of
national law in favor of foreign law. The intended effect and ultimate goal
is to remove entire classes of people and transactions from the protection of
their national law and subject them to foreign law. Under universalism, an
American citizen whose transactions are exclusively within the United
States will be forced into a foreign court applying foreign law in the event
of bankruptcy by a foreign counterparty-even if the parties expected local
law to apply.
Moreover, universalism's claimed benefits are largely hypothetical,
abstract, and unproven. Its proponents promise overall economic gains and
efficiencies, but there is little proof that such benefits are actually
generated. In contrast, the economic harms are much more certain. Even if
one assumes arguendo that it does generate benefits, the question needs to
be asked: benefits for whom? Like the benefits, the beneficiaries are
hypothetical, but the injured parties are real and easily identifiable.
For those whose expertise and interests lie outside of bankruptcy law,
it may seem that the debate surrounding Chapter 15 involves arcane and
highly technical issues of interest only to bankruptcy professionals.
Actually, the debate should be of interest to anyone who cares about
fundamental social issues and policies. This is because universalism can
only work if countries relax their exercise of national sovereignty.
Universalism requires countries to cede authority over fundamental social
choices. Regardless of whether one supports strong or weak national
sovereignty, any discussion on this topic is necessarily about deeply held
societal norms, and Chapter 15 is no different.
If Chapter 15 and universalism offer uncertain benefits but certain
harms, why have their principles gained such a following? One explanation
is that Chapter 15 is part of today's growing trend to internationalize
American law. Much like the inclination of some Supreme Court Justices
to look to foreign law for guidance, it appears many bankruptcy scholars,
judges, and practitioners have developed a taste for international trendiness.
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This article contends that the debate surrounding Chapter 15 in bankruptcy
circles is a variation of the ongoing national debate regarding the citation of
foreign law in Supreme Court opinions. This internationalism is a
manifestation of an elite whose members congregate at conferences where
admission is limited to those who share the view that an international
approach to any issue is automatically better than the provincialism of
national interest. Chapter 15 is one of the accomplishments of this elite.
There is a major difference, however, between Chapter 15 and the
appearance of foreign citations in Supreme Court opinions. No one, not
even the Justices, asserts that foreign law controls constitutional
interpretation. No one has been deprived of rights or property because a
Justice wanted to display his or her affinity for foreign sources. Chapter 15,
on the other hand, is designed to permit the direct application of foreign law
within the United States and permits the loss of rights and property as
decided by a foreign court under foreign law-even for those who have
never ventured outside of the country and whose transactions have been
entirely within the country. Thus, the debate surrounding Chapter 15 is
about the actual erosion of national sovereignty and the actual loss of rights
and property. And as would be expected, the consequences of the policies
promulgated by the transnational elite are borne in large part by everyday
people (the ones who cannot afford international airfare) whose interests are
conveniently ignored.
It is questionable whether Congress was presented with a full picture
of the potential ramifications of Chapter 15. There apparently was little, or
no, opportunity for its critics to present their concerns, and Congress instead
received a uniformly happy prognosis for the law. Alternatively, perhaps
Congress believes that the judiciary will be able to sort out any problems
lurking in Chapter 15 by utilizing the safety valves built into the legislation.
The law does contain safety valves, but their use obviously depends on
judges who will recognize the problems. Regardless of which
governmental branch needs to guard against adverse consequences, there
are plenty of reasons for concern over the new law.
If an internationalist approach is in fact beneficial, it should be
subjected to more scrutiny than a reflexive embrace based more on trend
and fashion than thorough examination. It seems reasonable to ask that
international policies be measured against the cost to actual people and
national interests. National interests are not a product of random,
uninformed choices by backward interests, and there is no reason to think
that the abstract rationalizations of an international elite produce better
policies. This article explores these issues and recommends a narrow
application of Chapter 15 to protect fundamental social choices and
policies.
Part II of this article begins by defining basic terms that need to be
understood in order to discuss Chapter 15. The enactment of Chapter 15
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arose in the context of the debate over "territorialism" and "universalism"
as the appropriate models for a bankruptcy regime, and Part II discusses
these terms. Part III of this article summarizes some of the significant
changes to the Bankruptcy Code as a result of Chapter 15, and compares it
to the prior law. It also examines the genesis of Chapter 15, which is based
on a Model Law developed by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law. Part IV examines the purpose of Chapter 15. The
scholarship in this area reveals that it is more than just a statutory device to
promote international cooperation. Its ultimate purpose is to move the
countries that enact the Model Law toward a full universalist approach to
bankruptcy law. Part V discusses how Chapter 15 and universalism compel
an erosion of national sovereignty, and explains why erosion of national
sovereignty in the bankruptcy arena matters in the larger context of national
interests. Part VI examines the problems created by universalism. This
section argues that universalism's inherent weakening of national
sovereignty is not balanced by the supposed benefits, and that the only
certainties of universalism are the generated harms (including potential
constitutional problems). Part VII then presents the larger context in which
the debate over universalism has developed. American law in general is
being increasingly marked by a movement toward internationalism, and
perhaps the most visible debate is occurring over the Supreme Court's
growing reliance on foreign authorities to guide constitutional
interpretation. This article contends that the same forces and trends
exhibited by the Supreme Court's fascination with foreign law are the
motivating factors behind the push for universalism. This article questions
whether such forces and trends should be the basis for law making, and
contends that any movement toward internationalization should be tested
against the real world effects on those who are unable to participate in the
process in the same way as the transnational elite. Part VIII closes the
discussion by arguing that the safety valves in Chapter 15 should be broadly
construed and liberally applied in order to protect national interests and the
interests of the small participants in transnational bankruptcies.
II. DEFINITION OF TERMS: TERRITORIALISM AND
UNIVERSALISM
In order to understand the context out of which Chapter 15 arose, and
the potential consequences of Chapter 15, it is necessary to understand the
two competing and opposite models of international bankruptcy jurisdiction
that define the debate: territorialism and universalism.' Although the
1 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy,
98 MICH. L. REv. 2216, 2220 (2000) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality]; see
generally Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REv.
2276, 2282-302 (2000) [hereinafter Westbrook, Multinational Default]; John A. E. Pottow,
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debate encapsulates modem tensions relating to globalization, the issue
appears to have been first raised in the 1880s with an article in the Harvard
Law Review.2 However, the debate gained increasing momentum during
the 1990s as international economic activity gained pace.
Territorialism is simply the traditional practice of nations exercising
exclusive jurisdiction over assets and parties within their borders.3 It is the
default rule in every substantive area of law, including bankruptcy. 4 It rests
upon traditional notions of national sovereignty, which means that the law
of the sovereign is imposed on all people and property within its territorial
reach.5 In a multinational bankruptcy conducted under the principles of
territorialism, each country decides under its own laws how the debtor's
assets within its territory will be treated in the face of creditor claims,
without deferring to any foreign proceeding involving the same debtor.
6
The following is a simple example of territorialism. Suppose a
business has assets in both the Country A and Country B, and files a
bankruptcy petition in Country A. The laws of Country A will govern the
disposition of assets within its territory, but the assets in Country B are not
affected by the filing. The creditors in Country B may move to seize the
assets in Country B notwithstanding the bankruptcy filing. In order to
protect its assets in Country B, the business will need to commence a
separate bankruptcy proceeding in that country which would proceed under
the laws of Country B. Thus, there would be two separate and independent
proceedings, each applying its own law.
Universalism, on the other hand, is based on the concept of "one law,
Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 935,
944-52 (2005); In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 2001). As for the terms
"bankruptcy" and "insolvency," they will be used interchangeably for purposes of this article
(although bankruptcy lawyers and scholars will recognize that these terms in their purest
forms are not identical).
2 John Lowell, Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments for Creditors, 1 HARV. L.
REV. 259, 259-64 (1888).
3 LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 1, at 2218; Frederick Tung, Fear of
Commitment in International Bankruptcy, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 555, 561 (2001)
[hereinafter Tung, Fear of Commitment].
4 LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 1, at 2218.
5 Jay L. Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, the ALl
Principles, and the EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 5 (2002) [hereinafter
Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises]. To its detractors, territorialism is referred to
pejoratively as the "grab rule" because each nation's court grabs the assets within its
jurisdiction for distribution under its own laws. Andrew T. Guzman, International
Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2179 (2000); see also
Pottow, supra note 1, at 944-45.
6 LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 1, at 2218; see also Frederick Tung, Is
International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 31, 42-43 (2001) [hereinafter
Tung, Possible?].
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one court.",7 It envisions a single bankruptcy proceeding in the debtor's
"home country" where a single court applies the bankruptcy law of its
country and makes a unified worldwide distribution to creditors through
liquidation or reorganization.8 That court would have global jurisdiction
over all of the debtor's assets and creditors, wherever located, and displace
all the courts and bankruptcy laws of other countries. 9  Universalism
requires a country to defer to a foreign legal proceeding, even with respect
to property within its own territory and legal relationships formed and
wholly conducted within its own borders.'
0
By administering the case in one jurisdiction, universalism avoids
duplicative proceedings (and therefore duplicative administrative costs). Its
underlying theory posits that the overall value of the bankrupt estate will be
maximized because one forum will be able to realize the sum of the parts or
the going concern value, as opposed to a piecemeal liquidation or
treatment." Additionally, lenders' costs will theoretically be reduced
7 Tung, Possible?, supra note 6, at 40.
In its purest conceptual form, universalism aspires to the harmonization of one
worldwide, substantive law of bankruptcy. The most common model of
universalism, however, follows a pluralist route. Sidestepping the issue of which
substantive provisions the ideal bankruptcy law would possess, it simply selects
from one of the pre-existing bankruptcy regimes ex post. To the extent that other
courts are needed (to give legal force to the orders of the courts of the governing
jurisdiction), such courts could convene ancillary proceedings designed to
effectuate the controlling court's orders. The current universalist paradigm thus
concedes the divergence of present domestic bankruptcy laws and advocates only a
pluralist system of choice-of-law; its theory does not envision (or rely upon)
substantive harmonization of those bankruptcy laws.
Pottow, supra note 1, at 948 (citation omitted).
8 Guzman, supra note 5, at 2179; see also Jay L. Westbrook, Universalism and Choice of
Law, 23 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 625, 625-26 (2005) [hereinafter Westbrook, Universalism].
Professor Westbrook, a leading bankruptcy scholar, is widely acknowledged as the "most
eloquent and effective proponent of universalism." Guzman, supra note 5, at 2179-80.
9 Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 3, at 569.
1o Id. At its most extreme, universalists subscribe to a vision of one-world government
and promote a supposedly forward-looking, forward-thinking global perspective. Id. at 558.
11 Westbrook, Multinational Default, supra note 1, at 2285. For example, suppose a
bankrupt company owns an American factory that produces widgets with unique
specifications for sale in the United States. It also owns a facility in Mexico that makes
slight modifications to the American widgets to comply with Mexican requirements.
Suppose further that the Mexican facility can only modify widgets with the particular
specifications of its sister American company. The universalists would correctly point out
that the two facilities should be sold or reorganized together because the Mexican facility's
value lies in its ability to modify the American widgets. If sold separately, its value might be
limited to the value of its real estate and scrap value (with no value assigned to its
modification process). Under universalism, the two facilities would be administered
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because lenders will know in advance which law will govern repayment and
apply to their collateral.' 2 Thus, they are relieved of the burden of risk
assessment in the face of conflicting legal systems. Universalism's claimed
benefits can be summed up to include: (1) a more efficient allocation of
capital, (2) a reduction in confusion over competing domestic priority rules,
(3) a reduction in the lender's cost of monitoring foreign assets, (4) reduced
administrative costs due to a reduction in the number of proceedings, (5)
avoidance of forum shopping and the race to file, (6) facilitated
reorganizations, (7) increased reorganization or liquidation value, and (8)
the provision of overall clarity and certainty to all parties.' 3 The theory
concludes that such reductions in costs, and increases in efficiency, will
lead to a reduction in the cost of lending and a corresponding reduction in
the cost of capital for borrowers.' 4  The ultimate benefit is therefore
presented as enhanced global efficiencies and economic activity.
Universalism is also allegedly supported by the need for "market
symmetry," which is "the requirement that some systems in a legal regime
must be symmetrical with the market, covering all or nearly all transactions
and stakeholders in that market with respect to the legal rights and duties
embraced by those systems." 15 In order for bankruptcy law to be effective,
it must cover the entire market, and within the United States, this need for
market coverage explains why bankruptcy law is federal (in other words,
each state does not have its own bankruptcy law) and specifically provided
for in the Constitution.' The universalists extrapolate from this national
example to conclude that in a globalized marketplace, bankruptcy law needs
to be global.' 
7
According to one of universalism's supporters, "the majority view, at
least among academic circles, is that universalism is normatively superior
as an efficient and fair model to resolve cross-border defaults,
notwithstanding the ongoing preference for territorialism among many
together by a single court. Under a strict territorial approach, the two might be administered
completely separately by the two different courts. The territorialists will point out, however,
that territorialism allows for cooperation between the courts to realize the highest value for
the assets.
12 Jay L. Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, 64 FORDHAM L. REv.
2531, 2541 (1996) [hereinafter Westbrook, Maxwell Communication].
13 Guzman, supra note 5, at 2179; Pottow, supra note 1, at 947.
14 Guzman, supra note 5, at 2181.
15 Westbrook, Multinational Default, supra note 1, at 2283; Westbrook, Multinational
Enterprises, supra note 5, at 6; see also Pottow, supra note 1, at 940.
16 Westbrook, Multinational Default, supra note 1, at 2283-84.
17 The argument based on "market symmetry" begs the question whether bankruptcy law
"should" be globalized beyond borders. Just because national bankruptcy laws apply
throughout national territories does not mean that a bankruptcy law "should" have global
reach in derogation of national sovereignty. See infra Part VI.A.2.
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country's policymakers."' 8  However, "[d]espite the near-unanimous
support of the academic community, policymakers have chosen not to adopt
universalism. Although a number of other arguments have been advanced
for territorialism, its support leans heavily on a sense among judges,
legislators, and some academics that territorialism can help small, local
creditors.' 19
Territorialism and universalism are at opposite ends of the spectrum.
20
In the course of debate, the pure ideals of the two competing models have
been softened at the edges to widen their appeal and acknowledge actual
practice (to some degree). The modified versions are known as cooperative
territorialism and modified universalism, and are closer together on the
21continuum. 1 Cooperative territorialism permits a departure from strict
territorial sovereignty by encouraging cooperation on an as needed basis,
and contemplates the use of international conventions to govern such
matters as the return of improperly removed assets on the eve of
bankruptcy.22 The typical scenario would involve parallel bankruptcy
proceedings in each country with debtor assets, and cooperation would
occur through the interaction of agents appointed by each state to represent23
the bankruptcy estate located there. Modified universalism departs from
the pure universalist ideal by accepting the right of a country4 to refuse
(under certain circumstances) to defer to another country's court.
III. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 1525
Chapter 15 is entitled "Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases. 26
18 Pottow, supra note 1, at 951.
19 Guzman, supra note 5, at 2184.
20 There is also another model known as contractualism. It contemplates that a debtor
would contractually choose which country's law to apply with each creditor. Evelyn H.
Biery et al., A Look at Transnational Insolvencies and Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 47 B.C. L. REv. 23, 30-31 (2005).
21 Jay L. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 713, 716 (2005)
[hereinafter Westbrook, Chapter 15]; Pottow, supra note 1, at 952-55. According to
Professor Pottow, the universalists had to modify their position due to the "quixotism" of
their quest while territorialism had to be modified because of its "grottiness." Id. at 952.
22 Pottow, supra note 1, at 954-55.
23 Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 3, at 562.
24 Pottow, supra note 1, at 952. "Taken to its extreme, then, the discretionary safety
valve of modified universalism has the potential simply to 'modify' universalism back into
territorialism, because a state may refuse to defer to the controlling state when its laws are
different, i.e., when there is a true conflict of laws." Id. at 954.
25 This is not intended to serve as a comprehensive overview or discussion of Chapter 15.
This section merely identifies a few of the main features of the new law, especially the
features that are necessary to understand in relation to the discussion of sovereignty issues.
26 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
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Section 1501(a) enumerates five objectives: (1) cooperation between U.S.
courts and foreign courts, (2) "greater legal certainty for trade and
investment," (3) "fair and efficient administration of cross-border
insolvencies that protects the interests of all creditors, and other interested
entities, including the debtor," (4) "protection and maximization of the
value of the debtor's assets," and (5) "facilitation of the rescue of
financially troubled businesses, thereby protecting investment and
preserving employment., 27 Chapter 15 applies to bankruptcies of American
multinational corporations and foreign corporations with assets or
operations in the United States.28 It requires American courts to "cooperate
to the maximum extent possible with a foreign court or a foreign
representative.,29
A case under Chapter 15 is commenced by an application to the
court by a foreign representative for "recognition" of a foreign
proceeding.3° Chapter 15 focuses on what is referred to as a "foreign main
proceeding.' A "foreign main proceeding" is "a foreign proceeding
pending in the country where the debtor has the center of its main
interests. 32 An order granting recognition of a foreign main proceeding
8, § 801, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501-32). The term "ancillary"
generally refers to a limited proceeding which is designed to assist a foreign proceeding.
Biery, supra note 20, at 31. "Once an ancillary proceeding is invoked, the domestic court's
primary responsibility is to aid the foreign court in administering the debtor's assets." Id. at
31-32. In contrast to ancillary proceedings, parallel proceedings are full proceedings in each
country where the debtor has assets. Id. at 32; see also Westbrook, Multinational
Enterprises, supra note 5, at 10-12. The use of the word "ancillary" in the title of Chapter
15 indicates that purpose of the legislation is to promote "a general rule that countries other
than the home country of the debtor, where a main proceeding would be brought, should
usually act through ancillary proceedings in aid of the main proceedings, in preference to a
system of full bankruptcies ... in each state where assets are found." H.R. REP. No. 109-3 1,
at 108 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 171; see also Westbrook, Multinational
Enterprises, supra note 5, at 10.
27 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 801.
28 Westbrook, Chapter 15, supra note 21, at 715.
29 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 801. "Perhaps the most
innovative provision in the chapter is the authorization for the courts, as well as a trustee or
DIP [(debtor in possession)], to communicate directly with the foreign court and trustee
[pursuant to sections 1525 and 1526]." Westbrook, Chapter 15, supra note 21, at 723.
30 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 801. "Foreign
proceeding" and "foreign representative" are defined in § 802(b). Id. § 802(b).
31 Westbrook, Chapter 15, supra note 21, at 717. Chapter 15 also governs a "foreign
nonmain proceeding," which is defined as "a foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main
proceeding, pending in a country where the debtor has an establishment." Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 801. As one would expect, the
recognition of a foreign main proceeding triggers more provisions than a foreign nonmain
proceeding. Id. § 801.
32 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 801. As discussed later
in this section, the phrase "center of its main interests" is an example of the almost verbatim
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triggers a wide range of powerful provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 3
including the automatic stay 34 and the foreign representative's right to
operate the American portion of the business. 5 A court may dismiss or
suspend a domestic bankruptcy case if a foreign proceeding has been
granted recognition under Chapter 15 or the purposes of Chapter 15 "would
be best served by such dismissal or suspension. ''36  Chapter 15 applies
unless its application would violate public policy. 3  A foreign
representative applying for recognition is not required to make a showing
that public policy will not be violated.38 It is up to an interested party or the
court to raise the issue.
A fairly typical case under Chapter 15 may look something like this: a
Canadian company with its headquarters in Toronto commences bankruptcy
proceedings in Canada. It has one widget-making factory in Canada and
one in the United States. Each of the factories has unpaid employees and
suppliers. The American factory secures a bank loan from an American
lender, and the Canadian factory secures a loan from a Canadian bank. The
Canadian representative applies for recognition of a foreign main
proceeding under Chapter 15. The American court grants the application.
All proceedings and creditor actions in the United States are stayed, and the
Canadian representative takes control of all U.S. assets and operates the
American factory. The American creditors then pursue their claims in the
Canadian proceeding. The Canadian judge has jurisdiction over all the
assets and creditors and resolves all claims together.
The old Bankruptcy Code's nod to international issues was contained
in a single section repealed and replaced by Chapter 15. Section 30439
permitted the filing of ancillary cases in U.S. bankruptcy courts by foreign
representatives "to protect the dignity of concurrently existing foreign
proceedings. 'Ao The purpose of the section was to prevent the piecemeal
adoption of the language of the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency promulgated by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, because it is a phrase that is
unfamiliar to American jurisprudence.
33 id.
14 11 U.S.C.S. § 362 (2000) (LexisNexis 2006).
'5 Id. § 363.
36 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
8, § 802(d)(6), 119 Stat. 23, 145 (2005) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)).
37 Id. § 801. This section provides in its entirety: "Nothing in this chapter prevents the
court from refusing to take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States." Id.
38 Id.
31 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2000), repealed by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act § 802(d)(3); Westbrook, Chapter 15, supra note 21, at 714. In contrast to that
single section, Chapter 15 contains five subchapters and 32 sections.
40 Biery, supra note 20, at 33.
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distribution of assets in the United States by local creditors.4 ' While
Section 304 and Chapter 15 may have similar goals, a major difference
between the two is that the language of Section 304 was primarily
discretionary (as opposed to the mandatory language of many of the
provisions of Chapter 15). Section 304 did not require the courts to grant
any particular relief; it merely stated the court "may" grant the relief
enumerated in the section.42 This discretionary language resulted in a wide
variety of decisions under the old law, some maintaining territoriality, and
others embracing universalism.43 According to Professor Westbrook,
Section 304's language and prior case law apply only where they enable
the court to go beyond Chapter 15 in cooperating with the foreign court, but
do not apply where they limit relief under Chapter 15 .
41 Id.; In re Treco, 240 F.3d at 154.
42 11 U.S.C. § 304(b) (2000), repealed by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 802(d)(3), 119 Stat. 23, 146 (2005). This is in
contrast to the language of Chapter 15 which states that "an order recognizing a foreign
proceeding shall be entered" and a "foreign proceeding shall be recognized" if certain
conditions are met. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 801.
43 See generally Biery, supra note 20, at 41-48 (and cases discussed therein). There is
some debate as to whether Section 304 embodied universalism.
Unable to win adoption of a universalist law or convention, the universalists
asserted that [section] 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which had been adopted
in 1978, was such a law. Section 304 authorized the bankruptcy courts of the
United States to turn over control of U.S. assets to foreign bankruptcy courts. But
the statute added: "(C) In determining whether to grant [such] relief... the court
shall be guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious
administration of such estate, consistent with-(4) distribution of proceeds of such
estate substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by [U.S. bankruptcy
law]." Read literally, [section] 304 clearly limits authority to surrender U.S. assets
to situations in which the foreign court will distribute them in substantially the
same way a U.S. court would. But the universalists, many of whom were
themselves bankruptcy judges, chose not to read [section] 304 as written. Instead,
they claimed that [section] 304 authorized turnover of assets to foreign courts that
would distribute the assets substantially differently, as long as the foreign country
had a bankruptcy law "of the same sort generally as [the United States]."
Universalist judges, including Judge Burton R. Lifland, began surrendering U.S.
assets for distribution by foreign bankruptcy courts, and universalist
commentators, including Professor Jay L. Westbrook, cheered them on. The effect
was to sporadically implement universalism in the United States, at the expense of
the particular U.S. creditors whose assets were surrendered.
Lynn M. Lopucki, Global and Out of Control, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 79, 84-85 (2005)
(citation omitted) [hereinafter Lopucki, Out of Control]. Professor Westbrook has
characterized Section 304 as "modified universalism." Westbrook, Maxwell
Communication, supra note 12, at 2533.
44 Westbrook, Chapter 15, supra note 21, at 720.
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A. The Genesis of Chapter 15
Chapter 15 explicitly incorporates the Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency (the "Model Law") promulgated by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), based in
Vienna.4  In the 1990s, the issue of cooperation in international
bankruptcies became the subject of a "working group" formed by
UNCITRAL.4 6 The working group met twice a year, once in New York and
once in Vienna, and was comprised of delegates from the approximately 30
countries in the rotating membership of UNCITRAL, as well as observers
from any interested U.N. member state and interested international
organizations.47 The efforts of this group led to the promulgation of theMode Lawat UCITRL's48
Model Law at UNCITRAL's Thirtieth Session on May 12-30, 1997. The
Model Law was approved by resolution of the United Nations General
Assembly later that year in December.49
"The Model Law makes universalism the foundation of the United
States' international bankruptcy policy. ' 50 "The number one reason for
adopting it was to demonstrate the United States' commitment to the Model
Law and to cooperation and universalism generally, in the hope that [the
United States'] example would encourage other countries to follow." 5 The
drafters of Chapter 15 tried to avoid changing the language of the Model
Law, even where alternative language would have been consistent with
American statutory style and practice. Any departures from the text of the
Model Law were as narrow and limited as possible.53
IV. THE PURPOSE OF CHAPTER 15-A STRATEGICALLY
INCREMENTAL MOVE TOWARD UNIVERSALISM
Chapter 15 does not impose a pure universalist framework. It does not
commit the United States to a global, substantive bankruptcy law. There
45 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 801; Westbrook,
Chapter 15, supra note 21, at 719; Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises, supra note 5, at
18-19.
46 Westbrook, Chapter 15, supra note 21, at 719.
47 Jay L. Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563,
570 (1996) [hereinafter Westbrook, Insolvency Law]. The United States delegation was co-
led by Professor Westbrook. Id. at 563.
48 Biery, supra note 20, at 49; Westbrook, Chapter 15, supra note 21, at 2 n.3.
49 Biery, supra note 20 at 49.
50 Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143, 143 (2005).
[hereinafter LoPucki, Universalism Unravels].
SI Westbrook, Chapter 15, supra note 21, at 726.
52 Id. at 19.
3 Id. at 720.
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appear to be sufficient safety valves to protect American interests.54  In
some ways, it looks rather benign with its emphasis on cooperation and
communication. 5 If that is the case, however, why are its backers so happy
with the law?
56
Unable to obtain the whole loaf of universalism, perhaps they are
happy with the half loaf of Chapter 15, knowing that it represents a
significant step toward the ultimate goal of universalism. This
interpretation finds support in the expert and matter-of-fact scholarship of
universalism's proponents. The proponents openly acknowledge that it was
too much of a challenge to move the United States and other nations to full
universalism. The delegates who agreed upon the Model Law knew they
had to operate within practical constraints. For example, the reason why a
model law was generated (rather than a treaty, for example) was because it
would have been too difficult to achieve consensus over anything more
substantial than a model law.57 This also explains why the Model Law does
not attempt to substantively unify the different bankruptcy laws around the
world; there never would have been agreement.5 8
Appreciating the historic resistance to universalism, its proponents set
more modest goals for the Model Law. Thus, the purpose of the Model
Law is to advance universalism incrementally, 59 by gradually introducing
the acceptance of outcome differences in transnational insolvencies. The
gradual process permits "acclimation" to universalism. 60 "In summary,
54 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, § 801, 119 Stat. 23, 134 (2005) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1506, 1521(b),
1522(a)) (requiring the courts to satisfy themselves that interests of creditors are protected
before certain actions are taken).
55 See, e.g., id. § 801. To the extent that Chapter 15 concerns itself with cooperation and
communication, there is little reason to object to it. There is agreement that cooperation is
desirable. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A
Post-Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 696 (1999) [hereinafter LoPucki,
International Bankruptcy]. With respect to Chapter 15 in particular, there is merit to
formalizing the ability of courts to communicate with each other across borders, and to
conferring official recognition on the person who has authority over an insolvent estate. By
having a formal structure in place, courts are assured that they are acting within their
authority by communicating with a foreign court and that they are dealing with authorized
representatives. Plus, an established statutory framework relieves the courts of the need to
re-invent the wheel for each new case.
56 Westbrook, Chapter 15, supra note 21, at 713. "After years of receiving plaintive
emails from foreign bankruptcy lawyers, judges and academics asking when Chapter 15
would become part of United States law, we can at last celebrate its arrival." Id.
57 Westbrook, Insolvency Law, supra note 47, at 570; Pottow, supra note 1, at 958-59,
985.
58 Biery, supra note 20, at 50.
59 Pottow, supra note 1, at 970; Westbrook, Insolvency Law, supra note 47, at 571.
60 Pottow, supra note 1, at 988-90. Outcome difference simply means the fact that a
local creditor may end up far worse off under the application of a foreign bankruptcy law
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while not overtly trumpeting its universalist proclivities-and wisely so,
given the historically consensus-dooming touchiness of the ongoing
debate-the Model Law actually contains several provisions, albeit at the
margin, which begin to 'nudge' states along the way to ceding some
sovereignty.'
Thus, states come to accept some erosion of regulatory sovereignty.
62
Universalism remains, however, the "ultimate ideal., 63 "[T]here may be
some states that let their guards down because of the non-threatening nature
of the universalist provisions in the [Model] Law--states that may well be
surprised to find themselves moved slightly more along the universalist
continuum and, upon realizing where they are, unlikely to move back.,
64
Any question as to whether adoption of the Model Law was designed
to commit the United States to a universalist position was clarified by the
promulgation of the Principles of Cooperation in Transnational Insolvency
Cases among the Members of the North American Free Trade Association,
adopted by the American Law Institute in 2002 (the "ALl Principles").65
Professor Westbrook, a principal drafter of the ALl Principles, described
General Principle V as urging "the courts of the NAFTA [North American
Free Trade Agreement] countries [to] determine distributions from a
universalist perspective to the maximum extent permitted by their
respective laws." ,6 Thus, even if U.S. creditors were to succeed in initiating
an involuntary parallel proceeding, the ALl Principles direct the court to
dismiss it.67 Although the ALl Principles were developed in the context of
NAFTA, AlI recommends their application "to cooperate with proceedings
in non-NAFTA jurisdictions. 68
than under his own country's law. John A. E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in International
Bankruptcy: The Problems of and Proposed Solutions to "Local Interests," 104 MICH. L.
REv. 1899, 1906 (2006) [hereinafter Pottow, Greed and Pride].
61 Pottow, supra note 1, at 983.
62 Id. at 976-77. It is interesting to note that universalism's proponents have felt the need
to deny that the universalist aims of the Model Law were slipped past the Congress in
disguise (denying the contention that territorialist states were "hoodwinked" into adopting
the Model Law). Id. at 991.
63 Jay L. Westbrook, Fearful Future Far Off, 33 BANKR. CT. DEC. No. 25, A5 (1999)
[hereinafter Westbrook, Fearful Future] ("The Model Law does not make the terrible
changes that [LoPucki] suggests. He would be closer to right if the Model Law really did
embody 'universalism,' which I regard as our ultimate ideal.").
64 Pottow, supra note 1, at 991.
65 LoPucki, Out of Control, supra note 43, at 87. The ALl Principles were developed
specifically for use among the NAFTA countries. Westbrook, Chapter 15, supra note 21, at
714. However, they were also drafted with Chapter 15 in mind, and the ALI concluded that
they should be applied generally to multinational bankruptcy cases in American courts. Id.
66 Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises, supra note 5, at 35.
67 LoPucki, Out of Control, supra note 43, at 88.
68 Id. at 88; see also Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises, supra note 5, at 39.
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Despite the clear aim of the Model Law, it apparently was presented to
Congress as a benign model of cooperation that was not universalistic.69
Only its supporters were permitted to testify before Congress. 70 The entire
process was an exercise in universalism "through the back door."'', Thus,
there are two messages concerning Chapter 15, and the content of the
message depends on the audience. For Congress, the message was: Chapter
15 is about cooperation; there is no universalism in the legislation. When
the audience is comprised of internationalists, the message is: Chapter 15 is
a significant step toward eventual and inevitable universalism.
72
V. CHAPTER 15 AND THE EROSION OF NATIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY
So what is wrong with universalism? Why did it need to be de-
emphasized before Congress? The answer to both questions is simple.
Universalism necessarily requires countries to cede national sovereignty.
Strong national sovereignty and universalism are inherently incompatible.
Anyone who favors strong sovereignty views universalism as an
unacceptable outcome.
Although its proponents downplay the sovereignty issues, the first
indication that the issue is ever-present is found in the language of Chapter
15 itself. Section 1508 explicitly commands American courts to maintain,
as much as possible, uniformity of interpretation with other countries of the
Model Law, and the statute directs the courts to look to the decisions of
other countries that have adopted it.73 The legislative history of Section
1508 adds that the American courts should refer to the UNCITRAL Case
Law on Uniform Texts, which contains reports from national reporters all
over the world concerning court decisions interpreting treaties, model laws,
69 LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 50, at 166 n. 102 (citing Westbrook,
Fearful Future, supra note 63, at 5).
70 Id. at 166.
71 id.
72 It is also possible that universalism's supporters will argue that Chapter 15 achieves
the goal of "one court, one law." Now that Chapter 15 is law, they may argue that it fully
embodies universalism and will likely urge the courts to apply Chapter 15 as broadly as
possible (to the point, for example, where the public policy exception is rarely applied). This
scenario would be like a repeat of the universalists' arguments after the enactment of Section
304. See LoPucki, Out of Control, supra note 43 (describing the arguments to have Section
304 interpreted as universalism). This likely development underscores the point that the
enactment of Chapter 15 does not end the debate, but rather gives it more urgency because
substantive outcomes will depend on how much of the universalist ideal will be read into it.
73 Westbrook, Chapter 15, supra note 21, at 720. Section 1508 provides: "In interpreting
this chapter, the court shall consider its international origin, and the need to promote an
application of this chapter that is consistent with the application of similar statutes adopted
by foreign jurisdictions."
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and other text promulgated by UNCITRAL. 74 "Not only are these sources
persuasive, but they advance the crucial goal of uniformity of
interpretation., 75  The Model Law has been adopted in Eritrea, Japan,
Mexico, Poland, Romania, and South Africa, and those countries are to
serve as models for American jurisprudence.76 Section 1508 opens the door
wide for the introduction of foreign law, and moves the courts away from
the primacy of American law.
It could be argued that this reads too much into Section 1508.
However, the universalists' own interpretation of Chapter 15 raises serious
concerns about the status of national sovereignty. According to its
proponents, Chapter 15 does not adopt substantive rules of bankruptcy law
or change domestic law, "except as necessary to permit results that are fair
and sensible from a worldwide perspective."77  That exception is
breathtaking. It expressly subordinates domestic law to some global
standard, and domestic concerns must give way whenever the worldwide
perspective produces a more fair and sensible result. Moreover, some
universalists contend that the pursuit of nationalist, territorialist policies
always produces a suboptimal result compared to a situation where
countries embrace universalism. 78 Therefore, in their view, domestic law
must always be changed or subordinated.
Some universalists are quite open about the fact that national
sovereignty must be sacrificed. In arguing the superiority of universalism
over territorialism, Professor Guzman acknowledged that a local court's
deference to another country's court concerning the disposition of local
assets "re resents the loss of sovereignty of one country in favor of that of
another."" He further remarked: "Put simply, international business
activity requires the compromise of certain notions of national sovereignty
because many countries may have an interest in the fate of debtors and their
creditors." 80 Indeed, the universalists frame the problem in this manner:
14 H.R. Rep. 109-31(I), at 109-10 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 109-10.
75 d.
76 Id. The first country to adopt the Model Law was Eritrea. Westbrook, Multinational
Enterprises, supra note 5, at 74 n.81.
77 Westbrook, Chapter 15, supra note 21, at 721 (emphasis added). Professor
Westbrook's views carry special weight and merit particular attention because of his
involvement in the development of the Model Law and his central role in the drafting of
Chapter 15. Id. at n.41.
78 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of
Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775, 781 (1999); see discussion infra Part
V.A.1.
79 Guzman, supra note 5, at 2206.
80 Id. This casual indifference concerning the primacy of foreign law seems to be a
necessary trait for some of universalism's supporters. Fortunately, the Founding Fathers did
not have such a cavalier attitude on this issue. "[King George III] has combined with others
The New Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code
27:89 (2006)
"At the heart of the difference between domestic and transnational
bankruptcies is the fact that national governments take into account the
interests of and legislate only with respect to those parties within the
country.' They further complain that "[r]ules designed to protect the
interests of local creditors in the adjudication of bankruptcies may have
harmful results on the allocation of capital across countries by causing
suboptimal investment by multinational firms. ' 2
In the universalist's world view, an American citizen should give up
the protection of U.S. law and become subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of foreign law in the event of bankruptcy if she: (i) sold goods or services
on credit to a foreign corporation, (ii) was an employee of a foreign
company, or (iii) was injured by a foreign corporation. In effect, a foreign
corporation brings to the United States all of its domestic bankruptcy law
to subject us to a Jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution." THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 15 (U.S. 1776).
81 Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 78, at 781. At the risk of being flippant, one might
ask, "And the problem is...?"
82 Id. at 779. This statement, by itself, fully reflects the values of the universalists. From
an American perspective, the interests of American citizens are subordinated to the interests
of multinational companies (foreign and domestic). Benefits redounding to Americans must
be forfeited in favor of global benefits. Harms to personal interests are disregarded in order
to promote global economic efficiencies.
83 The harmful effects of universalism on unsecured creditors, unpaid employees, and tort
victims are discussed in more detail in Part VI.B, supra.
With the exception of (iii), universalism's supporters might argue that these outcomes are
acceptable because the U.S. citizen voluntarily enters into the relationship with the foreign
company. This, of course, presumes that loss of sovereignty is permissible when it is based
on voluntary transactions. Those on the political right should have significant objections to
this disregard of the traditional right of nations to exercise exclusive jurisdiction within their
borders. Those on the political left might question whether the transactions are truly
"voluntary." Given generally difficult economic circumstances, one might question whether
a trade creditor or worker has a "choice" when dealing with a foreign company. For
example, the American car industry is in the midst of a significant shedding ofjobs. Does an
unemployed, middle-aged auto worker have a "choice" if the only other available job is with
a foreign manufacturer?
Even if one accepts that the transactions are genuinely voluntary, the universalists still
have no answer to the problems described by Professor LoPucki regarding the uncertainty in
determining a company's "home country," which is discussed in further detail in Part VI.C.,
infra. To illustrate, suppose a trade creditor extends credit to a U.S. corporation that is
wholly-owned by a foreign company: The creditor knows the parent company is foreign, but
also knows that her customer is incorporated in her state. With the knowledge that she is
entering into a transaction with a corporation from her state, she expects that American law
will apply in the event of bankruptcy. However, this expectation can be easily frustrated.
The U.S. subsidiary could subsequently change its place of incorporation to a foreign
jurisdiction, or the foreign parent could commence a bankruptcy case in its home country
and include its subsidiary. In either case, the American creditor who enters into the
transaction with full knowledge and with expectation of the application of American law
could still find herself forced to pursue her claim in a foreign court under foreign law.
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and supplants American law in its entirety. The bankruptcy of a major
multinational company would thus result in thousands of employees and
creditors, and thousands of transactions losing the protection of American
laws. An entire social and commercial stratum would be carved out of the
country's sovereignty and subjected to foreign law. 84
Universalism welcomes this state of the world because it rejects the
notion that persons who deal with multinational companies have "vested
rights" in the application of their own local law. 85 Instead, the universalist
argues that protection of local creditors should be based on "the common
policies found in most [foreign] jurisdictions., 86 As a result, "[p]olitical
judgments about local asset disposition and allocation of local losses from
the foreign firm's demise are left in the hands of a foreign court.
Universalism effectively requires a state's precommitment to wholesale
deferral to other states' various prescriptions for financial distress."87
According to its supporters, universalism promotes certainty by
making one law paramount. It seems more plausible, however, that the
universalist vision of the world creates more legal uncertainty. Under
territorialism and traditional notions of sovereignty, a citizen or resident of
a country can rely on the fact that the laws of that country will be applied.
As a general rule, people do not live their daily lives wondering if they are
or will be subject to the laws of another country. Universalism, on the other
hand, necessarily creates more uncertainty. When considering job offers, a
person may need to consider the home country of the employer to
determine possible effects on wages and pensions in the event of
bankruptcy. A business owner may find herself having to consider the
repayment priorities of a different country when deciding to do business
with a foreign-based company.88 Instead of being able to rely on the
84 Professor Tung has described the flip-side of this scenario. See Tung, Fear of
Commitment, supra note 3, at 576. Because so many of the world's large multinationals are
U.S. companies, the chances are greater that a large multinational bankruptcy will involve an
American company and result in the application of American law to transactions in other
countries. To some, this might represent further encroachment of America's influence.
This leads to amusing speculation that universalists in the United States are actually
working to expand America's economic and legal influence at the expense of other
countries. Perhaps Chapter 15 is actually the legislative equivalent of Commodore Perry's
black ships in Tokyo Bay. One wonders how the non-American members of the
UNCITRAL working group would view this interpretation.
85 Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises, supra note 5, at 9.
86 Id.
87 Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 3, at 576.
88 Universalists would likely argue that such a need for the awareness of foreign laws is a
necessary price of increased international business opportunities and that it should be
welcomed because it is the result of a growing global economy. Suppose, however, that an
American business owner wants no part of the burden of monitoring international legal
consequences. The universalists might then assert that she can opt out of the possible
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application of national law, employees, business owners, and consumers
will be vulnerable to the possibility that they may become subject to a
foreign nation's law, without ever leaving home. Universalism disregards
and casts aside the normal expectations and social bargains that are implicit
in national citizenship or residency. It is difficult to understand how this
promotes certainty.
A. Why Should One Care about Bankruptcy Law?
At this point, a reader might question why a diminution of national
sovereignty in this context should arouse any concern. After all, this issue
is confined to bankruptcy law-an arcane comer of the law that most
laymen and even lawyers manage to avoid. One might think that as long as
the issue is only about bankruptcy and only debated among bankruptcy
scholars, there is no real problem. That line of thinking, however,
underestimates the nature and scope of the subject.
Unlike other areas of law, bankruptcy law is wholesale. It is law in
bulk. And it is drastic. Most types of legal proceedings decide a particular
issue or transaction. By contrast, bankruptcy affects not merely one or a
few distinct transactions but every legal relationship involving the debtor
firm. Ideally, bankruptcy produces a comprehensive restructuring of the
debtor's legal arrangements with creditors and equity holders, marshaling
all the debtor's assets while also holding out the possibility of saving the
going concern. The collective proceeding produces a complete reshuffling
of rights among a debtor and its various classes of claimants, overriding
legal rights that exist outside of formal insolvency proceedings.89
Because of its comprehensive reach, each nation's bankruptcy laws
embody and reflect that particular nation's social and political choices.90 It
is not just a simple matter of deciding who gets repaid. Bankruptcy laws
"profoundly reflect the legal, historical, political, and cultural context of the
countries that have developed them." 91 "Given the vast cultural differences
application of foreign law by deliberately limiting her transactions to American companies.
Even if she chose this route, nothing prevents her American counter-party from being
purchased by a foreign company after she has entered into her transaction. Thus, the
business owner cannot opt out.
89 Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 3, at 566 (describing bankruptcy law as "meta-
law"); see also Tung, Possible?, supra note 6, at 47 (bankruptcy law "provides for the
comprehensive restructuring of a firm and every legal relationship between a business and its
creditors and other interested parties" and overrides contract, property and other rights that
exist outside of bankruptcy).
90 Tung, Possible?, supra note 6, at 48. Bankruptcy laws reflect a nation's substantive
policy decision and are distributive, "deciding which creditors warrant special treatment in
distribution" and which transfers of assets to specific creditors should be set aside to further
the greater good of all creditors. Pottow, supra note 1, at 942.
91 Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and
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around the world, and the history of each country's economy and attitudes
about money and debt, there is no one-kind-fits-all bankruptcy system for
either enterprises or individuals. 92
These fundamental and wide-ranging policy choices are reflected in
the bankruptcy laws of various countries. For example, under the French
code, the court appoints an administrator to take control of the distressed
business. "The objectives of the administrator, as specified by statute, are
to maintain the firm as a going concern, preserve employment, and satisfy
creditors' claims, in that order."93 In the United Kingdom, by comparison,
control of a business in an insolvency proceeding passes to the creditors. In
the typical situation, a secured creditor appoints an administrative receiver
to "assume all the powers of the company's board of directors, with the sole
purpose of realizing sufficient funds to repay the debts owing to the secured
creditor., 94 The receiver has no duty to consider the interests of unsecured
creditors, and "has full discretion over whether to sell the firm as a going
concern, or close it and liquidate its assets piecemeal." 95
This simple comparison of neighboring and historically intertwined
Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 4
(2005) (presenting a wide-ranging survey and discussion of historical and cultural influences
in the development of bankruptcy laws in the United States and various countries in Europe
and Asia).
As an example of the different policies reflected by a particular country's bankruptcy law,
Professor Tung makes an interesting and intuitively appealing observation about different
tort and unemployment coverage systems.
Moreover, particular aspects of a state's bankruptcy rules may constitute only
incidental wrinkles that are part of broader programs. A state's priority ranking of
personal injury tort creditors in bankruptcy, for example, may relate to the breadth
and quality of its state-sponsored health care system. A state with relatively
comprehensive health coverage may depend less on tort law as a compensatory
device. A state's ranking of employee wage claims may reflect to some extent the
state's intended division of the costs of social stability between the public and
private sectors. The more generous the benefits to employees, the worse recoveries
general creditors receive. To the extent they are able, general creditors will pass
these losses on to borrowers in the pricing of credit.
Tung, Fear of Commitment, note 3, at n.79.
92 Martin, supra note 91, at 5. On the subject of debt forgiveness, for example, which
reflects fundamental views of commercial and social obligations, "people are less forgiving
about debt forgiveness than they are in the United States. In some parts of the world, not
paying debts is the ultimate disgrace. In other parts of the world, there simply is no personal
bankruptcy system, and little in the way of business reorganization either." Id. at 35.
93 Sergei A. Davydenko et al., Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study of Defaults in
France, Germany and the UK (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No.
89-2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=647861.
94 Id. at 4.
9' Id. at 4-5.
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Western European countries reveals widely diverging social choices. Not
surprisingly, France puts a premium on workers' rights. The United
Kingdom, on the other hand, with its adherence to a more laissez-faire style
of capitalism, puts the emphasis on repayment of lenders, with little, if any,
consideration given to employment concerns. Their bankruptcy laws reflect
fundamentally different views about the social contract among the citizens
and with the government, and the relationship between capital and labor.9 6
This comparison shows that bankruptcy law is not limited to technical
questions of priority among creditors, and amply demonstrates the validity
of Professor Tung's observation: "Bankruptcy law's wholesale purview
means that recognition of a foreign proceeding effects the wholesale import
of another state's regime for deciding sensitive policy issues. Political
judgments about local asset disposition and allocation of local losses from
the foreign firm's demise are left in the hands of a foreign court."
97
96 This article focuses on the erosion of sovereignty from an American perspective. An
internationalist might view this focus as typical American defensiveness or wariness
regarding foreign matters. The popular view among internationalists, even (or perhaps
especially) American ones, seems to be that the rest of the world is engaged in a headlong
embrace of globalism while America stays on the sidelines. Such a view, however,
misapprehends the interests of other countries. The evidence is weak (or at most
inconclusive) whether other countries are in a rush to trade national sovereignty for the
perceived benefits of internationalization. There is no question that the French government
would have serious objections to an American company in France using American
bankruptcy law to restructure or downsize its French work force. To assume that only
American sensibilities might be offended by universalism's goals would be incorrect.
Along these lines, it is a bit curious that America is one of the early adopters of the Model
Law, and one of the few major industrialized to have done so. Perhaps this is a reflection of
the enthusiasm of American and America-based globalists. However, they may be behind
the curve on the globalization issue. The rest of the world may have already reached the
point where serious doubts about further global integration are dominating the agenda. Few
would doubt that political and economic integration in Europe has brought innumerable
benefits to its citizens. The benefits to commerce and harmonization are readily apparent
when crossing the Rhine from France into Germany is as easy as crossing the Mississippi
from Illinois into Missouri. However, recent events show there is a limit to which ordinary
people can be pushed toward further integration when given a choice, as starkly
demonstrated by the resounding rejections of the E.U. Constitution by the voters in France
and the Netherlands in 2005. Furthermore, serious fault lines in the European Union are
being exposed by the possibility of Turkey's admission. These types of events should give
pause to universalism's supporters as to the feasibility and desirability of their goals.
97 Tung, Possible?, supra note 6, at 22. Along similar lines, Professor LoPucki poses the
following questions:
Under universalism, the court of the home country would have jurisdiction over
the bankruptcy case. But what would be included in that jurisdiction? Could the
court void an otherwise valid collective bargaining agreement? Relieve the debtor
of the burdensome effects of environmental laws? Suspend the payment of
pensions to retired workers? Risk the pension fund in a reorganization attempt?
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Professor Pottow's observation is equally valid: "When one state cedes
jurisdiction to another state to facilitate a market-wide resolution of the
default, it must fully subjugate its broad-reaching, deep-cutting, and policy-
rich bankruptcy laws to those of the controlling state. ' g Given the nature
of bankruptcy law, any erosion of national sovereignty through a
universalist approach encroaches upon and interferes with the basic
framework of a country's social and legal values. Thus, the concerns are
not "just" about bankruptcy law; the concerns are about a country's entire
social and legal fabric.
VI. THE PROBLEMS WITH UNIVERSALISM
So what is the problem with universalism? It apparently has
widespread support among academics and international bankruptcy lawyers.
Its supporters claim that it is synonymous with global growth and economic
efficiency. From afar, it presents an appealing vision. But closer inspection
reveals numerous flaws-flaws that cannot be explained away by its
supporters. This section summarizes several of the arguments against
universalism. This summary is not intended to be a comprehensive survey
or in-depth presentation of the arguments. It simply touches upon the issues
that have been raised and examined by others. Its purpose is to highlight
the fact that universalism's claimed virtues are not unchallenged and that
universalism has certain disadvantages. This discussion is necessary
because the universalists would argue that to the extent there is an erosion
of sovereignty, it is outweighed by the demonstrable benefits of
universalism and Chapter 15's move in that direction. This section argues,
however, that any benefits are imaginary, while the harms are certain.
A. The Unproven and Hypothetical Benefits of Universalism
1. The Lack of Proof of Economic Benefit
Much of the universalists' argument rests on notions of economic gain
and efficiency. A leading paper on the subject criticizes territorialism on
the basis that it distorts foreign investment and leads to an inefficient
allocation of capital. 99 The theory is based on the proposition that the
interest rates demanded by creditors will vary with and depend upon the
anticipated return in bankruptcy, which in turn will vary with each
LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 1, at 2237.
98 Pottow, supra note 1, at 951.
99 Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 78, at 778.
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country's application of its own territorialist laws.' 00 To illustrate, suppose
Country T's lenders are protected by a strict territorialist system that
guarantees them 100% repayment before any foreign lenders are paid, while
Country U's lenders are subject to a universalist regime that does not prefer
local lenders over foreign lenders. Because Country T's lenders have
greater assurance of repayment, they will be able to offer their loans at a
lower interest rate than Country U's lenders. Further suppose that the
anticipated rate of return on investment (apart from interest rate
considerations) in Country U is higher than the similar anticipated rate of
return in Country T. Despite the fact that Country U offers a higher rate of
return (before factoring in interest rate differentials), a multinational firm
may still choose to invest in Country T if the rate of return is higher after
factoring in the lower interest rate. 101
The universalists thus conclude that the multinational firm's
investment decision has been distorted as a result of territorialism. In this
illustration, the multinational investor has chosen "not to invest in the
country offering the greatest return on investment, accepting instead a lower
return in exchange for a lower interest on loans."'1 2  This distorted
investment decision is characterized as "a deadweight loss for society."1,0 3
'oo Id. at 779.
101 Id. at 789. Students of game theory will spot the Prisoner's Dilemma in this situation.
According to the universalists, the optimal result is the adoption of universalism by both
countries. However, one country can gain an advantage over the other by retaining a
territorialist system while the other moves to universalism. The worst result for a country is
to adopt universalism only to discover that the other country has remained territorialist.
Thus, there is a strong disincentive to adopt universalism.
Professor Tung has discussed the Prisoner's Dilemma in great depth in his article, Is
International Bankruptcy Possible?, supra note 6, at 22-39. In introducing his game theory
analysis, Professor Tung warned of the inherent lack of reality in treating countries as
efficiency-seeking black boxes in economic models and ignoring the dynamics of domestic
political influences:
In general, a state's preference for its own bankruptcy law and reluctance to
recognize foreign bankruptcy proceedings may arise from the desire of domestic
political actors to defend the policies implicit in their domestic laws. This may
include the preservation of any perquisites that redound to a particular group under
those laws. The complexities of a state's bankruptcy regime reflect myriad policy
decisions and political trade offs. These trade-offs might enhance the public
interest or merely the interests of the victors in domestic rent seeking contests.
Regardless of which, political actors will wish to preserve the balance struck in
their domestic bankruptcy rules. They will generally resist recognition of foreign
bankruptcy proceedings that would upset this careful balance.
Id. at 55.
102 Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 78, at 779.
103 Id. The work of Professors Bebchuk and Guzman is impressive for its quantitative
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The costs of distorted investment decisions are borne by the shareholders of
the multinational investors. 104
The problem, however, with these arguments is that there is no
empirical support for them. It is untested theory, and it is untested because
the actual state of the world is so far removed from the foundational
suppositions and assumptions of the theory. Even leading proponents of
universalism have expressed doubts as to whether any actual economic
efficiency gains will result and concede that the benefits are, at best,
abstract.105 Indeed, universalism's proponents concede that a territorialist
country can benefit economically by acting to protect its national
constituents. °6 Given the absence of demonstrable benefit, one wonders
why any country would choose to abandon the historic stability of
territorialism in favor of a radical overhaul to universalism. 10 7
2. The Problem with Market Symmetty
Universalism's supporters assert that a global economy needs a
bankruptcy regime to be co-extensive with the market. To support this
rigor. However, there is an underlying wishful element to it that raises questions about its
relevance. In essence, they argue that if nations abandoned territorialism-the longstanding
norm and condition of international relations-we would all benefit. But it is also true that if
all borrowers agreed to refrain from fraud and pay back their loans, then the cost of capital
would be reduced and we would all benefit. Just as it is in the nature of borrowers to
occasionally not repay their loans, it is in the nature of nations to assert their territoriality and
sovereignty. Thus, what is the point of wishing otherwise?
One more hypothetical takes this question a step further by looking at the behavior of
nations. The universalists could also argue that if only the United States would share its
classified technology with China, then it could outsource the manufacturing of its military
aircraft and naval vessels to Chinese companies which could produce them at much lower
cost due to cheaper labor. The resulting savings would benefit all of us. Thankfully, this
will never happen for obvious reasons, and there is no point lamenting any claimed
deadweight loss to society.
This last point highlights another fundamental problem with the quantitative model
presented by Professors Bebchuk and Guzman. The purpose of their model is to persuade
policymakers that territorialism ought to be abandoned in favor of universalism. This would
require, of course, a significant overhaul of national laws and abandonment of traditional
notions of national sovereignty. They urge this result on the basis of a model that
incorporates only a few variables. However, any move away from territoriality necessarily
raises issues of national security, the relationship of capital and labor, debtors and creditors,
etc. The complexity of any decision regarding such issues is probably beyond the scope of
any reliable quantitative model.
'04 Id. at 800.
105 See, e.g., Westbrook, Multinational Default, supra note 1, at 2326.
106 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 78, at 780.
107 The political realities also suggest that a national legislature would have little
incentive to adopt universalism. "The losers of territorialism-the ones who pay for the
benefits gained by the territorialist and the deadweight loss that is generated-are foreign
firms." Id. Foreign firms do not vote, and thus have no constituency power.
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point, an analogy is drawn to the laws governing intellectual property.10 8
However, a closer analysis of the intellectual property analogy arguably
leads to the opposite conclusion-namely, that bankruptcy law cannot be
global.
The need for a co-extensive legal regime governing intellectual
property rights is explained as follows:
Without intellectual property rights created by law, the information
(e.g. the invention or composition) would be a pure public good. In a
world without intellectual property, for example, the first copy of a
new book could be copied by the first purchasers. This copy could
then be copied by others. Eventually, the "free" copies would
dominate the market. And this would destroy the incentives of
authors to write! ... Intellectual property law comes to the rescue.
By enforcing patents and copyrights through legal sanctions,
intellectual property law transforms information from a public good
to a toll good.'
Intellectual property law is about protecting the private property rights
of the creator. The law needs to restrict access and copying in order to
prevent the intellectual property from becoming a public good, and it is the
legal regime that assures the value of the property.
However, as discussed in Section V.A, supra, bankruptcy law is
concerned with more than just private property rights. Bankruptcy law is
also concerned with the ordering of public goods. The level of employment
108 See Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises, supra note 5, at 6-7; see also Westbrook,
Multinational Default, supra note 1, at 2283 ("[T]here are legal systems that cannot function
effectively unless their scope is symmetrical with the market. That is, they must govern the
interests of all parties throughout the market whose interests may be implicated. A common
example of such a system is the law of intellectual property, which in virtually all
jurisdictions is co-extensive with a national market and which imposes rules that govern the
rights of all potential stakeholders, whether or not they have contractual relationships inter
se.").
109 Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 029: Public and Private Goods,
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal theorylexicon/2004/03/legal theoryle.html (last visited
Mar. 28, 2004) (emphasis added) ("A toll good is characterized by nonrivalrous consumption
but excludability."). Rivalrous consumption means that consumption of a good prevents
someone else from consuming it. Consumption of an apple is rivalrous because if someone
eats it, someone else cannot. An idea is nonrivalrous because it can be "consumed" or
enjoyed by an indefinite number. Excludability means someone can be prevented from
consuming or enjoying a good.
A public good is both nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. As an example, a country's
national defense is a public good. Id. It is nonrivalrous because protection of one citizen
does not diminish protection of another. It is nonexcludable because when a country defends
a particular territory, it cannot exempt some of the citizens in that area from protection. For
example, the military could not decide to defend an apartment building but leave the
residents of the third floor exposed to the opposing forces.
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in France is a public good that is protected by its bankruptcy laws. The
social contract with labor is a public good that is enforced by Mexico's
priorities in bankruptcy. These public goods can only be protected so long
as a nation guards its sovereign interests. This necessarily implies that
bankruptcy laws can only extend as far as a nation's borders.
The distinction between private property and public good is
significant. The value of intellectual property depends upon and increases
with the expanding (geographic) reach of intellectual property law. Thus,
there is a strong incentive for those who value intellectual property to
expand its legal protection as wide as possible. The only parties who are
negatively affected by such an expansion are those who wish to use the
property without compensation, i.e. those with a weak or illegitimate claim
to the property. With a public good, on the other hand, there is no such
universal incentive to expand the reach of the law. The definition of a
public good varies with each country, and the expansion of law to promote
one country's public good encroaches on another country's policy. As in
the example of France and the United Kingdom, in Section V.A, supra, the
expansion of the United Kingdom's support for the right of lenders would
impair France's protection of its workforce. Given these unavoidable
conflicts, there is no universal incentive to expand the reach of the law.
B. The Harm to Unsecured Creditors
In contrast to the hypothetical benefits, even its supporters concede
that universalism harms unsecured creditors in many instances. By way of
a simplified illustration, suppose a company based in Country X has
$100,000 of assets in the United States that are available to unsecured
creditors and $100,000 of such assets in Country X. It owes $100,000 to
unsecured claimants in America who (under the facts of this hypothetical)
enjoy a statutory priority over other general, unsecured creditors pursuant to
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and $900,000 to other unsecured claimants
outside of the United States who do not enjoy any priority status. Under a
territorialist system, bankruptcy proceedings could be commenced and
proceed separately in the United States and Country X. The American
unsecured claimants (who enjoy priority) would seek recovery out of the
$100,000 of assets located in the United States, and would recover 100
cents on the dollar. In a universalist regime, however, the company would
file one case in Country X, which would have jurisdiction over all the assets
and creditors. Suppose Country X did not recognize the priority enjoyed by
the American creditors under U.S. law. 110 There would be a total of
110 The foreign court would subject American creditors to its own laws regarding priority
of payment. See Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 3, at 572. "There are substantial
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$200,000 in assets to satisfy $1,000,000 in claims, and each unsecured
claimant would recover 20 cents on the dollar-a significant reduction for
the Americans.
The universalists defend the harm to the American creditors in this
example by invoking the principle of the "Rough Wash.""' The theory is
that a universalist rule will roughly even out benefits and losses for local
creditors over time and as numerous cases are decided under universalism,
because they will collectively gain enough from foreign deference to the
local forum in one case to balance any loss from local deference to a foreign
forum in another.
112
There is an obvious problem with the "Rough Wash" justification.
The local creditor who is harmed by the application of universalism in one
case will not be the same local creditor who benefits from universalism in
the next case." 3 In effect, the universalists urge unsecured creditor A to
accept his financial loss in this case so that a stranger, unsecured creditor B,
may gain in the next. One wonders if the universalists have ever asked a
real life unsecured creditor A for his response to this proposal. Moreover,
the benefits of the "Rough Wash" theory "are difficult or impossible to
measure empirically."
'
"
14
1. The Harm to Tort Creditors
Many large bankruptcies have been filed in the United States due to a
debtor's exposure to mass tort claims. Some of these cases have involved
thousands of tort claimants, and the courts have been called upon to address
differences in priority rules around the world despite a pattern of preference for certain
creditors, like secured parties, employees, and tax authorities." Westbrook, Universalism,
supra note 8, at 635 n.41. For example, the United States gives special priority status to
grain producers and fishermen. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2000). These creditors would lose their
priority status in another jurisdiction with a different set of priorities:
In effect, local claimants' rights, which would ordinarily include collection rights
against the debtor's local assets, adjudicated by local courts under local law, would
instead under universalism be disaggregated from those local assets and subjected
to foreign rules applied by a foreign court in light of foreign claims.
Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 3, at 572.
111 See, e.g., Pottow, Greed and Pride, supra note 60; Jay L. Westbrook, Theory and
Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 457, 464 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism].
112 See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 5, at 2185; Pottow, Greed and Pride, supra note 60, at
1909; Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 11, at 465.
113 See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 1, at 2218.
114 Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 111, at 468.
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the harms and resolve the claims. 1 5  American bankruptcy courts have
developed an expertise in adjudicating mass tort claims, and the American
bar is well-equipped to represent such claims." 16 However, the universalist
ideal would deprive American claimants of their day in their court.
The harm to tort creditors is demonstrated by the following
hypothetical. Suppose a Chinese company owns a refinery and several
producing oil wells in the United States. 17  Due to an incident at the
refinery, thousands of residents in the surrounding area are seriously
injured. Their claims threaten to overwhelm the company, and the
company's lenders and suppliers become nervous about doing business with
it. However, the producing oil wells generate sufficient revenue to cover
most of the claims. Under the historical, territorialist system, the company
would commence a bankruptcy action in the United States, and a resolution
would likely be reached where the claims would be satisfied out of the
present and future revenues of the producing wells." 8
Under universalism and Chapter 15, on the other hand, the company
could file bankruptcy in China (which would be the main foreign
proceeding). An order granting recognition in the United States would
automatically stay the victims' claims in the United States. Furthermore,
the tort victims would not be eligible to file an involuntary petition in the
United States to force the Chinese company into bankruptcy proceedings." 
9
In the pure application of universalism, the tort victims would have to go to
China and seek justice in a Chinese court applying Chinese law.
The universalists might argue that this scenario would never happen in
real life because no American judge would allow that result and would
certainly invoke Section 1506, the public policy exception. One would
115 See generally Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution
Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1361, 1367 n.17 (2005).
116 The bankruptcy courts have developed the expertise to resolve mass tort claims due in
large part to the many cases involving liability for asbestos claims. Id. at 1367, n. 17.
117 This hypothetical was drawn from the recent, failed attempt of a Chinese oil company
to buy Unocal, an American oil company. CNNMoney.com, Unocal to Talk with Chinese
Bidder soon, http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/24/news/international/unocalwaiver/ (last
visited June 24, 2005).
118 McGovern, supra note 115, at 1367 n.17.
"9 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b). Under this statute, an involuntary case may only be filed by a
holder of a claim "that is not contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute as
to liability or amount." This language excludes the tort claimants in the hypothetical.
120 It is fair to conclude that this hypothetical involving a Chinese company is exactly the
type of situation for which Section 1506 was designed. China's ability to handle reasonably
complex cases is suspect due to its weak courts and poorly qualified judges. Donald C.
Clarke, China's Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for Compliance, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STuD. L. REv. 97, 108 (2003). As of 1995, only five percent of China's judges had a four-
year college degree in any subject. Id. Moreover, "China's courts are at present not fully
reliable as enforcers of statutorily guaranteed rights." Id. at 109. There is also the well-
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certainly hope that would be the case. However, what if the oil company
were based in France, Italy or Spain? Many would agree that presents a
closer call, and universalists might urge the American court to force the tort
victims to press their claims in liberal and democratic Western Europe.
Such variations in these factual scenarios test the contours of the
public policy exception. The universalists argue that being forced into a
distant forum is not, by itself, reason to reject universalism or the
application of Chapter 15, because this already occurs in the United States,
for example, when California claimants are forced into a Delaware
bankruptcy court. The existing case law supports the view that expenses
due to travel and the hiring of far away counsel do not constitute undue
prejudice.121 Thus, the burden is no more onerous for foreign jurisdictions;
after all, Houston is closer to Mexico City than New York City. This
argument overlooks, of course, the fact that a California claimant in
Delaware can rely on the fact that English is the language of the court, and
that the proceedings will be governed by the Bankruptcy Code, the
Bankruptcy Rules, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules
of Evidence, and the U.S. Constitution. 122  No such assurances exist in
Paris, Rome, or Madrid.
But if the burden of litigating in a distant forum does not trouble the
universalist, what about the fact that American tort claimants will not have
the benefit of American-style representation, procedures, or remedies? For
example, most of the world's advanced legal systems (including Western
European ones) reject class action-style litigation.' 23 As a result, claimants
in the foreign jurisdiction would also be deprived of well-financed and
known problem of corruption in the judiciary. Id. Indeed, on Transparency International's
Corruption Perception Index 2005, China scores a dismal 3.2 out of 10. Transparency
International, http://www.transparency.org/policyandresearch/surveysindices/cpi/2005
(last visited Oct. 1, 2006). According to its website, Transparency International is the
"leading international non-governmental organization devoted to combating corruption."
Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/about us (last visited Oct. 1,
2006). On its Corruption Perception Index, a score below 5 indicates serious levels of
corruption. Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/policyand-research/
surveysindices/cpi/2005/mediapack (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
121 See Biery, supra note 20, at 39.
122 Thus, at a minimum, consistency of substantive law is an obvious given, unlike the
situation when national borders are crossed. "In some countries tort creditors share pro rata
with commercial creditors; in other countries, tort creditors are subordinated to commercial
creditors; and in yet others, tort creditors who have not yet reduced their claims to judgments
before bankruptcy do not share at all." LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 1, at
2224 (highlighting laws of Mexico, Spain and the United States, as they were at the time of
publication). Moreover, the need to translate documents would impose a burdensome and
perhaps prohibitive cost.
123 See generally Michele Taruffo, Some Remarks on Group Litigation in Comparative
Perspective, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 405, 413 (2001).
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aggressive plaintiffs' counsel. Again, it is unclear whether the universalists
would concede that the public policy exception should be triggered under
these circumstances. 124 Even Professor Westbrook has acknowledged the
significant harm posed to tort creditors, wondering whether tort victims
should be exempted from a universalist regime. 125 The problem, of course,
is that Chapter 15 does not carve out an exemption for tort victims, and they
are left to take their chances before a judge who may or may not worship at
the altar of internationalism.
Fortunately for tort victims, there may be constitutional protections
that will trump any universalist attempt to force them into a foreign court.
For example, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the
right to petition; this right includes the right of access to the courts. 126 If
Chapter 15 were to force tort victims out of the American courts, would that
violate their First Amendment rights? The Fifth Amendment prohibits the
124 Professor LoPucki has pointed out the dramatic differences in the value of claims in
the U.S. tort system versus their value in foreign systems:
What was thought to be $3 billion in claims against Union Carbide for the deaths
of 4,000 people in Bhopal, India was settled for $470 million when it became
apparent the cases would be tried in India rather than in the United States. The
recent settlement of breast implant claims in the Dow Coming bankruptcy
expressly gave foreign women lower payments than U.S. women for the same
injuries, on the theory that those injuries were worth less under foreign procedures.
LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 1, at 2225-26.
125 Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra 112, at 489.
126 Cal. Trans. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972); see also Tern. v. Lane,
541 U.S. 509 (2004) (ruling on "fundamental right of access to the courts"). The
fundamental importance of access to the courts is also enshrined in, among other places, the
Civil Rights Act of 1866:
[A]ll persons bom in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right in
every state and territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
14 Stat. 27 (1866) (emphasis added). Of course, most members of the UNCITRAL working
group were probably unfamiliar with this Act, and the heavy price America paid to reach that
point in its history. But such are the kinds of rights that the sophisticated elite so easily
disregard in the pursuit of their goals of global harmony and economic efficiencies.
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taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Would
there be a taking if the tort victims were forced into a foreign court?
127
A thorough analysis of the constitutional issues is beyond the scope of
this article, and this brief discussion is merely an exercise in issue
spotting. 28 Nonetheless, if the universalists are to prevail in their attempts,
they will need to address these issues fully. 129 It is understandable that most
of the delegates to the UNCITRAL working group on the Model Law
probably did not realize that the U.S. Constitution might have some bearing
on their efforts. But this demonstrates an important point-those in favor
of an internationalist solution to all of the world's ills need to bear in mind
that what they propose often runs counter to deep issues of fundamental
rights embraced by sovereign nations, and that nations and their citizens
will not simply forfeit these rights on the urging of a self-selected elite.
127 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), which suggests the
possibility of a constitutional problem based on the Fifth Amendment. That case arose out
of the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November, 1979 and the taking of American
hostages. In response to this crisis, the President froze Iranian assets in the United States,
and also placed certain restrictions on judicial proceedings against Iran. In December 1979,
Dames & Moore commenced a lawsuit in a U.S. District Court against the government of
Iran seeking damages for breach of contract. In January 1989, the American hostages were
released pursuant to an agreement between the United States and Iran. This agreement
required (among other things) the United States to terminate all pending legal proceedings in
its courts brought by its nationals against Iran and to refer all such matters to binding
arbitration before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. In the meantime, the U.S. District
Court entered summary judgment in favor of Dames & Moore for the amount of its claim.
Dames & Moore then filed an action against the United States to prevent enforcement of the
agreement with Iran.
The relevant part about this case with respect to Chapter 15 is that the petitioner argued
before the Supreme Court that the government's actions constituted a Fifth Amendment
taking concerning its claim against Iran. The Court acknowledged the validity of the issue,
but did not rule on it because it was not ripe for review.
To the extent that Dames & Moore can be viewed broadly as a case where an American
claimant was deprived of its rights to have its claim resolved in an American court and was
instead forced to pursue its claim in a foreign tribunal, a claimant in bankruptcy could
arguably raise a similar Fifth Amendment challenge to the application of Chapter 15. It must
be conceded that this analysis is cursory and untested.
128 Another possible issue is raised by a recent article about the constitutional problems
created by the Supreme Court's reliance on foreign authorities. See Robert J. Delahunty and
John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 291, 292 (2005). Professors
Delahunty and Yoo make the interesting argument that such use may violate the
Appointments Clause. Deference to foreign decisions "would subject American citizens to
the judgments of foreign and international courts, and the Constitution makes no provision
for the transfer of federal power to entities outside of our system of government. To the
contrary, the Appointments Clause directly limits the transfer of federal power." Id. at 299.
Query whether this analysis is applicable to Chapter 15 as well.
129 If these constitutional problems are embedded in Chapter 15, then that would put to
rest any justification based on the "Rough Wash" principle.
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2. The Harm to Employees
The claims of unpaid employees in bankruptcy raise another thorny
problem for universalism. 130 The problem arises because such claims are
treated in materially different ways across borders. In some countries,
unpaid employees may have priority over other unsecured creditors and
even most secured creditors.'31 In contrast, unpaid employees in the United
States enjoy no such priority over secured creditors.'13  The following
scenario illustrates the potential harm. Suppose workers in Country B
enjoy special priority for recovery of unpaid wages. Suppose further that
such workers are employees of a U.S. company that commences a
bankruptcy case. Under a universalist system, the Country B workers will
find themselves seeking payment of unpaid wages in an American court
applying American law, which does not recognize the special priority. The
prejudice would be magnified if the American business has had a long-
standing presence in Country B, with relationships developed over years or
perhaps decades. This passage of time would only serve to deepen
expectations that the law of Country B would apply. Another form of
prejudice would result if the employer were a corporation formed under the
laws of Country B but wholly-owned by an American parent. The Country
B subsidiary could find itself being administered in the United States if the
subsidiary were brought into the parent's bankruptcy. In such an event, the
workers (whose rights were formed under the laws of Country B) would
still find themselves in an American court under American law.
It is very difficult for a court in Country B to tell a group of Country B
employees who have worked in a branch office in Country B for years that
they will not enjoy the special priority distribution rule accorded to workers
under Country B's bankruptcy laws, even though there are plentiful assets
in Country B to cover such a payout, because their employer's bankruptcy
will be governed under the laws of Country A, which grants no such
priority.
13
Universalism acknowledges this problem and the potential prejudice to
employees, but it is unable to provide an answer to solve the problem.
130 Guzman, supra note 5, at 2196 ("[t]reatment of employees presents a more complex
problem.").
131 LoPucki, International Bankruptcy, supra note 55, at 710 (discussing law of Mexico,
as of time of publication).
132 American employees are, however, entitled to a certain level of priority among
unsecured claims for unpaid wages "but only to the extent of $10,000 for each individual...
earned within 180 days" before the filing of the bankruptcy petition or the cessation of the
business. 11 U.S.C.S. § 507(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2006).
133 Pottow, supra note 1, at 951.
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3. The Universalists' Response Regarding the Harm to Unsecured
Creditors
Universalists are fully aware of the problems raised by the treatment of
unsecured creditors, but they offer no solutions. Instead, they respond to
the problem by asserting that the concerns of unsecured creditors are too
small to merit a solution, and that global economic gains should not be
sacrificed just to placate nationalistic concerns for small, local creditors.
One leading universalist has dismissed the concern for unsecured creditors
by observing: "Rather than consider the impact of territorialism on all
creditors, however, attention is often drawn to a small number of creditors
that seem to elicit sympathy from commentators. '1 34  The argument
continues that such small creditors should not sway the debate because the
dollar amounts of their claims are too small, especially when compared to
the other claimants in a large bankruptcy such as million or billion dollar
international lenders. 135 "It is important to keep in mind, however, that they
represent only a small fraction of the total value at stake in a bankruptcy,
and that adopting territorialism to assist these creditors will impose a cost
on the entire system-ultimately leading to a higher cost of lending., 136
The question is then posed: "Should the efficiency of the bankruptcy
process be compromised for the majority of creditors in order to assist this
minority?"1 37  The universalists' position confirms Professor LoPucki's
observation that universalism will harm the smallest or least sophisticated
participants in a bankruptcy.1
38
134 Guzman, supra note 5, at 2195.
135 See id. at 2194.
136 Id. at 2195.
137 Id. Professor Westbrook suggests that these problems can be avoided by applying
universalism only to "large" multinationals. Westbrook, Universalism, supra note 8, at
2298-99. However, Professor Tung points out that large cases will probably generate more
issues involving local creditors and interests:
If the size of the firm bears any relation to the level of its local activity, however, it
would seem that a "large" firm would be at least as likely to engage in significant
numbers of local transactions-employment and supply contracts, for example-
as a smaller multinational firm. Moreover, the failure of the large multinational
may have significantly greater local effects than failure of a small one.
Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 3, at 576 n.82.
138 LoPucki, Out of Control, supra note 43, at 102-03 ("The losers will be the corporate
outsiders who have no means of controlling their debtor's choice of courts: tort victims,
employees, suppliers, customers, other stakeholders with small interests, and-as with every
strategy game-the less sophisticated players."). The monetary value of these small interests
may be dwarfed by the claims of multinational banks. On the other hand, a large bankruptcy
can involve thousands of small claimants, while the number of large lenders will be
considerably less.
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C. The Incentives for Forum Shopping and Manipulation of Venue
A fundamental premise of the universalist approach is that a debtor
corporation has a home country, or a "center of its main interests" (to use
the language of the Model Law and Chapter 15). This premise is necessary.
Otherwise, a debtor doing business in a multitude of countries could simply
choose whatever forum offered the most benefit to it in a bankruptcy,
regardless of the strength of its ties to that forum. 139 The home country
requirement is designed to provide assurance that there will be a sufficient
nexus between the debtor and the forum and to enable potential creditors to
determine in advance the law that will be applied. Professor LoPucki has
forcefully presented, however, the problem with the home country standard.
The home country standard has four fatal flaws that in
combination will permit almost unbridled forum shopping and
encourage court competition. First, many of the largest
multinational companies do not have home countries in any
meaningful sense. When they file for bankruptcy, these
companies each will be able to choose among the courts of two or
more countries. Second, even multinational companies that do
have clear, unmistakable home countries can, and already do,
change them. Third, as the U.S. experience has shown, with
billions of dollars of business at stake for bankruptcy
professionals, competing courts cannot be counted on to
determine fairly and in good faith whether they are the home
court of multinationals that choose to file with them. Each will be
biased in favor of its own jurisdiction. Finally, if international
forum shopping and competition do-as I expect they will-run
out of control, mechanisms for fixing the problem do not exist.
International institutions are not strong enough to impose a
solution. 140
In his comprehensive series of articles, Professor LoPucki has
described the incentives for forum shopping and venue manipulation under
a universalist regime.141 In summary, Professor LoPucki points out that
universalism is an all or nothing system where one court runs the entire
worldwide proceeding, and someone must be the first to decide which court
will run it. 1 2 That someone will be the court in which a case is first filed. 143
"That means the case placers-the debtor, its attorneys, and their
139 See id. at 80.
140 Id. at 81.
141 See LoPucki, International Bankruptcy, supra note 55; see LoPucki, Cooperative
Territoriality, supra note 1; see LoPucki, Out of Control, supra note 43; see LoPucki,
Universalism Unravels, supra note 50.
142 LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 50, at 148.
143 See id.
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contractual allies-will choose the court that makes the venue decision.
144
This will lead to a competition for cases because the country that gets the
case will set the business for its own professionals and prefer its own
creditors.' 4  Moreover, the potential for harm resulting from international
forum shopping is much greater than any harm resulting from forum
shopping in a domestic context. Forum shopping for a different bankruptcy
court within the United States only results in a (possibly) different
interpretation or application of the Bankruptcy Code. 4 6- Foreign shopping
among countries results in an entirely different set of remedies, a change in
the priorities among creditors, a change in avoiding powers, and an
invalidating of security interests. 1
47
Professor LoPucki has also described the strategic behavior of
multinational companies in changing venue by changing their home
country. 48 The following example involving Singer, N.V. (whose origins
are traced to Singer, the old sewing machine manufacturer) was set forth in
Global and Out of Control?.49 A Hong Kong company bought Singer in
1989, and changed Singer's place of incorporation to the Netherlands
Antilles and its headquarters to Hong Kong. When Singer filed for
144 Id.
145 See id.
146 See LoPucki, Out of Control, supra note 43, at 79.
147 LoPucki, International Bankruptcy, supra note 55, at 721.
148 See id. at 722; LoPucki, Out of Control, supra note 43, at 97.
In A Global Solution to Multinational Default, Professor Westbrook makes a reference to
sham incorporations under "a flag of convenience" in his response to Professor LoPucki's
concerns over forum shopping. Westbrook, Multinational Default, supra note 1, at 2316.
The use of the phrase is interesting because the actual practice in admiralty law bolsters
Professor LoPucki's argument that the incentives to forum shop undermine universalism.
Strangely enough, admiralty law does provide a useful (if unconventional) analogy to
universalism. Under universalism, each corporation, in effect, carries the flag of its home
country wherever it does business in the world, and all who do business with it become
subject to the laws of its home country in the event of bankruptcy. Under admiralty law, a
ship on the high seas is (in a sense) a part of the territory of the country whose flag it flies.
Scharrenberg v. Dollar S.S.Co., 245 U.S. 122, 127 (1917); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 100, 123 (1923). As a result of this legal principle, ship owners choose to register their
vessels in countries with favorable or lax regulations under so-called flags of convenience,
and escape the burdens of their home countries-forum shopping, in other words. See
generally Tony Alderton & Nik Winchester, Regulation, Representation and the Flag
Market, J. MAR. REs. (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.jmr.nnm.ac.uk/server/show/
conJmrArticle.53/viewPage/l. So, what has been the result of the incentives for forum
shopping? "Despite the fact that the concept of a genuine link has been enshrined in
international law, the last fifty years or so has seen the evolution of the FOC [Flag of
Convenience] system to the extent that, by 1998, 51.3% of the world's total gross
tonnage.., was registered to FOC fleets." Id. (emphasis added). This is compelling
evidence from real world practice to show what happens when incentives and opportunities
to forum shop present themselves.
149 LoPucki, Out of Control, supra note 43, at 98-99.
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bankruptcy in 1999, it was no longer an American company.
Singer wanted, however, to reorganize in the United States.
Shortly before filing in the New York bankruptcy court, Singer
hired a CEO in New York and declared New York its
headquarters. But even after the New York court assumed
jurisdiction over Singer's worldwide operations, Singer remained
concerned whether the courts of other nations would recognize
the U.S. proceeding and enforce the plan against "numerous
international creditors who might assert that they were not subject
to U.S. jurisdiction." The problem was that Singer's parent
company, Singer, N.V., was still a Netherlands Antilles company.
To solve the problem ... Singer filed a motion seeking authority
to create a new wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary of Singer N.V.,
Singer U.S.A. L.L.C. ("Singer USA"). After Singer USA was
formed, the proposal was to transfer all of Singer N.V.'s assets
(Singer N.V.'s equity interests in its subsidiaries) to Singer USA
and to cause Singer USA to guarantee all of Singer N.V.'s
liabilities. Thereafter, Singer N.V.'s sole asset would consist of its
equity interest in Singer USA . . . The next step would be for
Singer USA to file its own Chapter 11 petition, thus bringing
Singer USA within the protection of the U.S. bankruptcy court.
The final step was to propose a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization
for Singer USA that eliminated Singer N.V.'s equity interest and
issued 100 % of the new equity in Singer USA to Singer USA's
creditors, i.e., the holders of the obligations of Singer N.V. that
Singer USA had guaranteed. 15 0
In sum, Singer replaced the Netherlands Antilles corporation with a new
American one, placed the new corporation into bankruptcy in New York,
and obtained plan confirmation. This example demonstrates the
creativity of counsel, and there is little that universalism can do to stem
lawyers' ingenuity.
More recent actual events have further confirmed Professor LoPucki's
predictions. The European Union adopted a universalist bankruptcy
150 Id. (quoting Evan D. Flaschen & Leo Plank, The Foreign Representative: A New
Approach to Coordinating the Bankruptcy of a Multinational Enterprise, 10 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 111, 123 (2002)).
151 Professor LoPucki has also cited other examples of corporations changing their
structure in anticipation of bankruptcy. They include (i) "Dreco Energy, which moved both
its headquarters and center of operations from Canada to the United States in contemplation
of bankruptcy"; (ii) "Commodore, which moved its headquarters and place of incorporation
from the United States to the Bahamas for tax reasons before filing bankruptcy there"; and
(iii) Bank of Commerce and Credit International (more commonly known as BCCI), "which
moved its headquarters from London to Abu Dhabi before filing bankruptcy at its place of
incorporation in Luxembourg." LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 50, at 155.
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scheme for its members, which became effective in 2002.152 As soon as the
universalist system became law, venue disputes among E.U. countries
erupted. 153 As an example, a dispute surfaced between Italy and Ireland
conceming jurisdiction over the bankruptcy of Eurofoods, a subsidiary of
Parmalat.' 4  Furthermore, Professor LoPucki's concerns regarding the
home country standard have been confirmed by the European Commission
in its official statements. 55 Thus, any doubts about the forces involved are
quickly dispelled by looking at actual cases.
Universalism's supporters also tend to ignore the significant financial
incentives for strategic case placement, and the motivations driving law
firms to place the case in their local court. The high financial stakes and
rewards involved in a large bankruptcy case are seen in the bankruptcy of
United Airlines, where the debtor's law firm, by itself, billed approximately
$93 million in fees for its work on the case. 156  With such staggering
amounts up for grabs, the incentives for strategic positioning and forum
shopping are obvious. If a law firm and others affected by case placement
face the prospect of losing out on tens of millions of dollars in fees and
costs, it can be reasonably assumed that much effort will be devoted to
devising a strategy for case placement. The lawyers will not sit on the
sidelines waiting for hypothetical global efficiencies to determine who will
win the fees.
D. The Likelihood of Bizarre Results
According to its supporters, universalism leads to greater predictability
for debtors and creditors because each party knows in advance the law that
will govern a possible bankruptcy. If an American bank lends to a French
company with assets in the United States, France, Germany and Italy, the
bank can rely on the fact that French law will govern the borrower's
152 Commission Regulation 1346/2000, On Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160)
(EC).
153 LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 50, at 144.
154 LoPucki, Out of Control, supra note 43, at 95 (citing other examples, as well).
155 See U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade (UNCITRAL), Draft UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on
Insolvency Law, Compilation of Comments by International Organizations, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/558 (June 14-25, 2004), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commis
sion'workinggroups/5Insolvency.html. In that document, the European Commission
addressed the issue of an insolvency filing by a group of companies, and noted that there had
historically been two approaches within the European Union--"the 'companies group'
approach (based on economic criteria)" and "the 'incorporation' approach (based on the head
office jurisdiction)." Id. at 3. It then pointed out that "there are some contradictory cases by
national courts that show the difficulty of applying common criteria in practice." Id.
156 United's Bankruptcy Tab: $335 Million-plus in Fees, USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 2006,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2006-03- 1 0-ual-bankruptcy-fees-x.htm.
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bankruptcy and that it need not weigh its legal risks under four different sets
of bankruptcy laws.
Professor LoPucki, however, has demonstrated that the real world is
not quite so simple in a hypothetical involving Daimler-Chrysler. 57 At the
top of this corporate group of automobile manufacturers is a company
called Daimler-Benz, the German parent corporation. Daimler-Benz owns
several subsidiaries operating in dozens of countries, one of which is the
American corporation called Daimler-Chrysler Corporation. Daimler-
Chrysler, in turn, has its own subsidiaries which manufacture automobiles
in about a dozen other countries. One of Daimler-Chrysler's subsidiaries is
Chrysler de Mexico, S.A., which manufactures automobiles only in
Mexico.
In the event of a bankruptcy filing by the corporate group, a
universalist would require administration of the case in Germany, the home
of the parent corporation. The result would be the administration of the
affairs of Chrysler de Mexico, S.A. in Germany, with the court applying
German remedies and priorities to transactions principally and, often times,
exclusively among Mexicans. 158 This result would no doubt fulfill the
dream of the internationalist. However, it would be a result in complete
disregard of the expectations and practices of the Mexican parties.
Moreover, it is difficult to detect where the claimed economic and
jurisprudential efficiencies would arise. The parties would find themselves
in a distant court, represented by distant counsel and operating in a foreign
language.
E. The Questionable Assumption of Convergence of Laws
One of the universalists' goals is to drive nations toward a
convergence of their laws. 5 9 Convergence is, in fact, a necessary feature of
universalism because there must be a general similarity of laws in order for
it to be workable.' 60  Otherwise, attempts at a universalist treatment of
bankruptcies would always be frustrated by courts exercising the public
policy exception to prevent local claimants from being subjected to laws
157 LoPucki, Out of Control, supra note 43, at 93. This hypothetical is based on Daimler-
Chrysler's corporate structure as it was in 1997. Id. at 93 n.46.
158 This result is consistent with the ALI Principles. See Westbrook, Multinational
Enterprises, supra note 5, at 38 (subsidiaries should be allowed to file for insolvency in the
home country of the parent, and corporate groups should be reorganized from a worldwide
perspective like a single company).
159 See Westbrook, Multinational Default, supra note 1, at 2288.
160 See id. at 2291; Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 112, at 468 (a
"prerequisite to obtaining the benefits of universalism is general similarity of laws"); Biery,
Boland & Comwell, supra note 20, at 29.
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fundamentally inconsistent with their own. Because of the general
convergence of laws among developed nations, the universalists would
argue that an American court should have no hesitation in deferring to the
jurisdiction of court in the European Union, for example. The reluctant
judge should be reassured by the fact that the liberal democracies of
Western Europe will provide a fair and predictable forum for foreigners
because the laws and proceedings are transparent. The statutes and
procedures are open and readily ascertainable by any informed reader.
This argument, however, rests on a large and faulty assumption. It
assumes that the law as it exists in text is actually applied. The fallacy of
this assumption was exposed in a recent paper discussing the Parmalat
bankruptcy. A common view of the Parmalat scandal is that the
company's downfall was caused by lax Italian rules governing financial
reporting.162 Professors Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Guidici refute that view,
however, and point out that the actual cause of the problem was the fact that
the laws on the books were not enforced. 163 Indeed, they further pointed out
that Italian laws were actually quite severe-more severe than American
laws in some instances; they just were ignored by the governing
authorities. 164
The lesson from this example is clear. Universalists try to address
concerns by pointing to the law on the books of other developed countries
and giving assurances that the laws have sufficient similarity to ensure fair
treatment of claims. What they cannot provide, however, is assurance or
proof that the laws on the books are actually enforced. Mere text by itself
provides nothing without enforcement. Universalists need to address this
issue before offering up universalism as the ideal.1
65
161 Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Guidici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private
Enforcement: The Parmalat Case (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper
No. 40/2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=730403. Parmalat was a large Italian
producer of dairy products, which became the subject of insolvency proceedings due to
financial fraud. It was one of the largest bankruptcies in Europe and has been described as
Europe's Enron.
162 Id. at 26-31.
163 Id.
164 Id. A similar situation regarding lack of enforcement also exists in China. See
Clarke, supra note 120, at 109 (discussing "the tendency of Chinese courts not to
aggressively seek jurisdiction over cases, but on the contrary to fear it and often to go to
great lengths to avoid taking difficult or sensitive cases").
165 There is also the somewhat related issue of corruption, which obviously affects
whether a country's laws are enforced. According to Transparency International's
Corruption Perception Index 2005, only 42 out of 159 surveyed countries score 5.0 or
higher, which means 117 countries have a score indicating serious corruption. Transparency
International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2005 (2005), available at
http://www.transparency.org/policyand-research/surveysindices/cpi/2005. Italy and
South Korea, two developed international trade powerhouses, score a borderline 5.0. Id.
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F. Summary
If universalism's benefits exist at all, they are hypothetical. Its harms,
on the other hand, are concrete, and the parties who pay the price are easily
identifiable. The universalists' response is that the harms are small in
quantity and those who suffer the harms are not important enough to stand
in the way of global gains. Even if one accepts the values underlying this
calculus, universalists are hard pressed to demonstrate tangible gains.
Perhaps universalism can be best described as an idealized vision of global
harmony, full of benefits for multinational enterprises, without the annoying
distractions of political reality or the whining of wage-earners or small
business owners.
VII. CHAPTER 15 IN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN LAW
Although universalism has widespread support among academics,
even its supporters must acknowledge or have acknowledged that its
claimed benefits are abstract and hypothetical. A belief in its benefits
requires a leap of faith, and many have already jumped. Given the
uncertainty of its advantages, one wonders why there is so much
momentum behind it. The reason appears to be that there are many who
simply believe that anything "international" is automatically better than
anything local. In that regard, it is more than coincidental that Chapter 15
became law at the same time as debate grew over the Supreme Court's
increasing and controversial reliance on foreign authorities, as exemplified
by cases such as Lawrence v. Texas,' 66 Roper v. Simmons,167 and Atkins v.
Virginia. 68  Indeed, this article contends that the debate in bankruptcy
Greece, a member of the European Union scores 4.3. Id. Of the countries that have enacted
the Model Law, Eritrea scores a 2.6, Mexico (America's NAFTA partner) a 3.5, Poland a
3.4, Romania a 3.0, and South Africa a 4.5. Id. In other words, these countries have scores
indicating a serious level of corruption. The legislative history of Chapter 15 directs
American courts to look to these countries for guidance because they are "persuasive" and
"advance the crucial goal of uniformity of interpretation." Supra Part V (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 109-3 1, at 110 (2005)).
166 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down state law criminalizing homosexual conduct).
167 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (barring application of death penalty to juvenile offenders).
168 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (barring execution of mentally retarded capital defendants). Dean
Harold Koh has characterized the ideological divide as follows (from his own internationalist
perspective):
More fundamentally, the last Supreme Court Term confirms that two
distinct approaches now uncomfortably coexist within our own Supreme Court's
global jurisprudence. The first is a "nationalist jurisprudence," exemplified by the
opinions of Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas. That jurisprudence is
characterized by commitments to territoriality, extreme deference to national
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circles about Chapter 15 and universalism is actually part of the larger and
ongoing debate over the Supreme Court's reliance on foreign authority to
interpret the Constitution. These debates center around the extent to which
the United States (or any country for that matter) should yield its
sovereignty in deference to a foreign authority. The embrace of all things
international on the part of some is a sign of the times, and deserves closer
scrutiny. 16
9
executive power and political institutions, and resistance to comity or international
law as meaningful constraints on national prerogatives. This line of cases largely
refuses to look beyond U.S. national interests when assessing the legality of
extraterritorial action. Moreover, these decisions have largely rejected
international comity as a reason unilaterally to restrain the scope of U.S.
regulation, and dismiss treaty or customary international law rules as meaningful
restraints upon U.S. action. To deal with perceived exigencies, these rulings have
broadly deferred to federal executive power, largely unchecked by
judicial oversight, "clear statement" principles, or claims of individual rights.
When advised of foreign legal precedents, these decisions have treated them as
irrelevant, or worse yet, an impermissible imposition on the exercise of American
sovereignty.
A second, more venerable strand of "transnationalist jurisprudence," now being
carried forward by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, began with Chief Justice (and
former congressional secretary for foreign affairs) John Jay and Chief Justice (and
former secretary of state) Marshall, "who were familiar with the law of nations and
comfortable navigating by it." In later years, this school was carried forward by
Justice Gray in Hilton v. Guyot and The Paquete Habana, and by three members of
the Supreme Court-Chief Justice Melville Fuller and Justices David Brewer and
William Day-who helped found the American Society of International Law,
along with William Howard Taft, who later became president, then chief justice, of
the United States. During the tenure of Chief Justices Earl Warren and Burger,
the transnationalist position was championed by Justices William J.
Brennan, William 0. Douglas, and-particularly his famous Sabbatino dissent-
Justice Byron White. And in the Burger and early Rehnquist Courts, the leading
transnationalist role was played by Justice Harry Blackmun.
Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 52-53
(2004) (footnotes omitted).
169 The controversy has reached the point where several members of the House of
Representatives submitted a resolution to express their disapproval of this practice. See H.
R. 97, 109th Cong. (Feb. 15, 2005). The resolution contains some interesting language that
is relevant to this discussion of Chapter 15. Among other things, it states:
Whereas Americans should not have to look for guidance on how to live their lives
from the often contradictory decisions of any of hundreds of other foreign
organizations; and
Whereas inappropriate judicial reliance on foreign judgments, laws, or
pronouncements threatens the sovereignty of the United States, the separation of
powers and the President's and the Senate's treaty-making authority ....
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The irony of the highly visible debate over the Supreme Court's
practice is that the effects of citing foreign authority are mild compared to
the requirements of Chapter 15. The Supreme Court did not state that it
was bound by foreign law in Lawrence, Roper or Atkins; it looked to
foreign law as a form of guidance.1 70 The foreign authorities were merely
decorative justifications for the decisions. 171 As such, "the practice of citing
to international law may contribute little of analytical value and have no
real effect on the actual course of judicial decisionmaking.' ' 172 Chapter 15,
in contrast, is more than decoration and dictates substantive outcomes. The
debate involving the Supreme Court is, in large part, about symbolism
(although symbolism regarding the Constitution certainly requires
attention). Chapter 15, on the other hand, directly affects basic property
rights (and also implicates constitutional concerns), yet its passage has
largely escaped notice. The parallels between the two debates, however,
show that they are actually part of the same debate, and the scholarship
regarding the Supreme Court provides beneficial guidance to the debate
over Chapter 15.173
In connection with the Supreme Court debate, one scholar has written
that the introduction and use of foreign authority "invites the deployment of
a sweeping body of legal materials from outside U.S. domestic law" and
"invites [foreign authorities] into American society's most difficult and
contentious 'values' questions.' 74  This statement applies equally to the
Id.
170 "The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does
provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions." Roper, 543 U.S. at
578.
171 See John 0. McGinnis, Foreign to our Constitution, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 303, 310
(2006).
172 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 128, at 292. At the same time, Delahunty and Yoo also
caution that reliance on foreign authorities may be more than "mere ornamentation" and
warn against such reliance. Id.
173 A critic of this article might interject that the debates are not similar for one
significant reason. Congress has expressly stated that foreign authority is relevant in the
interpretation and application of Chapter 15, and that the courts should be guided by other
countries that have adopted the Model Law. Thus, the use of foreign authority for Chapter
15 is more akin to reliance on foreign authority to interpret a treaty in that foreign law is
inherently and inextricably part of the law. In that regard, a bankruptcy judge does not
"choose" to look to foreign law; the statute requires it.
This argument only goes so far, however. The main battle over Chapter 15 will be about
the expansiveness or narrowness of its application (as determined by the public policy
exception, for example), and whether it really is just thinly-disguised universalism. This
article contends that the significant and larger issue is whether domestic, national interests
should defer or be subordinated to foreign law, and that this larger issue is what the Supreme
Court debate is about.
174 Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, POL'Y REv., June & July
2005, at 33-34.
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bankruptcy context due to the values-laden nature of bankruptcy law.
The debate concerning the Supreme Court also provides lessons
regarding the universalists' implicit agnosticism regarding different national
laws. Universalists generally refrain from making value judgments about
various legal systems. They are less concerned about which country's law
applies; the main concern is that one law apply. 175 The Supreme Court
debate, however, has generated perceptive analyses regarding national laws,
which argue that the individuality and distinctiveness of national laws do
matter. Professor John McGinnis' observations along these lines are
especially compelling.
A foreign law, including a foreign court decision, is simply not
framed with reference to being applied anywhere but to its own
nation. Even if its decision is the product of a democratic consensus
or some other process that creates good norms for the foreign nation,
the content of that consensus is that the norm should be applied in its
own nation .... A related difficulty with the use of foreign law is that
any such law is part of a complex system of related norms and
foreign structures in that nation'
7
Professors McGinnis and Lund also note:
Any judicial opinion from another culture is the culmination of a
complex institutional structure for producing norms. The low cost of
accessing the mere words of a foreign judicial opinion can blind us
to the fact that we are only seeing the surface of a far deeper social
structure that is in tension with American institutions.
77
Such observations seem particularly applicable to bankruptcy law due
to its comprehensive reach and embodiment of innumerable, fundamental
values.
The debate has also generated some interesting observations regarding
the social dynamics of internationalism. It seems that much of the impetus
toward global harmonization is an outgrowth of conferences in exotic
locales attended by law professors and judges who bask in a shared
cosmopolitanism. This socialization process may explain the fascination
with internationalization. In discussing the motivations of Supreme Court
Justices to cite foreign laws, Professor McGinnis wrote:
At a more sociological level, the citation of foreign sources of law
reflects the globalization of the judiciary. Supreme Court judges
175 Tung, Possible?, supra note 6, at 4.
176 McGinnis, supra note 172, at 311.
177 Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102
MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1605 (2004).
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interact with their peers in other nations on a more regular basis.
Their long summer recess is a perfect time to make the acquaintance
of justices in their favorite nations. Lake Como or the south of
France provides a good atmosphere for bonding. All of us seek
approval from our peers and the Justices would naturally regard
foreign justices as their equals. These peers would appreciate the
citing of their handiwork.
17
,
If one were to substitute "judges" and "justices" with "law professors,"
this quote might describe the manner in which the UNCITRAL working
group arrived at the Model Law. 179 There is a big difference, however. A
Justice's concession to vanity or appeal for acceptance does not subject an
American to foreign jurisdiction. No one has been deprived of property
because the Supreme Court decorated its opinions with European
embellishments.
Professors Robert Delahunty and John Yoo have provided further
thoughts on this theme:
Globalization has abetted the emergence of a variety of 'global
networks,' including networks of governmental power-holders who,
over time, may form a common outlook based on personal ties,
shared experiences, and the like. Such global networks seem to be
resulting in the creation of a transnational class of judicial and
regulatory elites who are increasingly freed from the constraints of
territoriality, national sovereignty, and domestic political
constituencies, and whose judicial and administrative decisions
reflect an increasingly harmonized outlook. As Professor Jonathan
Macey has observed, "[m]any people, particularly those active in the
foreign policy community, view regulatory cooperation as an end in
itself. Cooperation in the international sphere is a form of global
178 McGinnis, supra note 172, at 326-27.
179 There is also the question of which interests are represented at such conferences:
[Law professors] are not required to be representative of the views of their nation's
citizens nor are they likely to be so. We have evidence, for instance, that
elite international law professors in the United States are very unrepresentative of
popular opinion ... International law judges are no more likely to
be representative. Some are appointed by nations whose leaders are not elected.
Moreover, they are biased toward discovering consensus among states even when
it does not exist to create more international law and thus more power
for themselves.
Id. at 314 (emphasis added). In a similar vein, Professor LoPucki has observed that "[m]ost
of these professionals are well-meaning, good-hearted idealists, working for what they see as
an improvement in the system. A few are schemers, seeking to advance themselves or their
local bankruptcy courts." LoPucki, Out of Control, supra note 43, at 79.
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social norm." The phenomenon has deeper and broader implications
than the mere engineering of channels for institutional cooperation
across national boundaries. The phenomenon appears to be linked to
the emergence of what can be called a deterritorialized,
"cosmopolitan" moral sensibility, generally shared by governing
elites of the advanced nations.'80
Although written in the context of the Supreme Court debate, these
observations apply directly and equally to the Chapter 15 debate, and
demonstrate that both are part of the larger controversy about sovereignty
issues. If nothing else, Chapter 15 and universalism seek freedom from the
constraints of territoriality, national sovereignty, and domestic political
constituencies.
The heady mix of historic settings, inspiring architecture, five-star
comfort and social acceptance by foreign elites as one of their own provides
a potent and intoxicating melange for those who travel the international
legal circuit. Their thoughts inevitably turn to a starry-eyed vision of a
globalized world guided by their cosmopolitan sophistication. The world,
however, is populated by people who labor and start their own businesses
for uncertain rewards, and they expect their governments (at least in
democracies) to enforce their social choices. Their concerns seem to be
invisible at the international conferences, but they are the ones who
inevitably pay for the theories of the transnational elite who look only to
each other for validation.
Typically, the work product of the transnational elite rarely sees the
light of day outside of the conference rooms of luxury hotels, but Chapter
15's supporters have been particularly successful and effective in
converting their visions into reality. Regardless of whether one agrees or
disagrees with their views, they certainly cannot be criticized for lack of
talent or success. The question now is whether Chapter 15 will develop
into a more complete universalist system. Perhaps most people have no
trouble with these implications, and if that is the case, then those views will
prevail. If, on the other hand, most people have serious concerns with or
objections to the consequences of Chapter 15 and universalism, attention
needs to turn to the available mechanisms to limit the effects.
VIII. THE NEED FOR BROAD APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC
POLICY EXCEPTION
Now that Chapter 15 is law, is it too late to stop the erosion of
sovereignty (assuming one accepts that as a desirable goal)? Fortunately,
Chapter 15 contains built-in safety valves, and it may be the case that
180 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 128, at 329 (citations omitted).
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Congress has placed the responsibility of protecting U.S. interests on the
courts. The main safety valve is Section 1506, the public policy exception.
Additional safety valves are built into Sections 1521(b) and 1522(a), which
require the courts to ensure that the interests of creditors and other
interested entities are "sufficiently protected."
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These provisions should enable the courts to stem the potentially
prejudicial consequences of Chapter 15. The problem, however, is that
many judges will likely be introduced to Chapter 15 at conferences where
the only voices on the subject will be those of universalists. They will be
reminded of the legislative history of Section 1506, which states that the
public policy exception has been narrowly interpreted on a consistent basis
in courts around the world, and that the word "manifestly" in international
usage restricts the exception to the most fundamental policies of the United
States. 18 2 They will be further reminded that the lofty goals of global
growth and harmonization will be frustrated if the public policy exception is
liberally applied.
It is the hope of this article that a more balanced view will be
considered, so that the courts will understand that it is their responsibility to
closely examine the effects of recognition, and to act forcefully to protect
American creditors. This means broad and generous application of the
public policy exception to the point where, if necessary, it becomes the
exception that swallows the rule. Perhaps the judiciary will draw
inspiration from the judge who stated "this Court does not intend to stand
idly by while United States citizens and creditors are harmed.' 83  Of
course, such courage in the face of internationalist criticism will come at a
heavy price. That judge will probably not be invited to speak at
conferences of assembled elites at five star hotels in Salzburg, Barcelona,
and Milan.
IX. CONCLUSION
The debate over territorialism and universalism has been active and
sustained for over a decade now, and the universalists are prevailing. Their
success is evidenced by the fact that Chapter 15 is the law of the land.
However, several questions remain. What does Chapter 15 do? What
purpose does it serve? Whose interests are served? This article does not
dispute the benefits of international cooperation among courts in the
appropriate circumstances. There are also compelling reasons for lawyers
and judges to widen their perspectives to take into account events and
practices in other places. To the extent that Chapter 15 acts in furtherance
"81 11 U.S.C.S. §§ 1521(b), 1522(a) (LexisNexis 2006).
182 H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 109 (2005).
183 Interpool Ltd v. Certain Freights of M/V Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373 (D.N.J. 1988).
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of these goals, there is little basis for criticism. However, its proponents
have a much grander vision in mind, and it comes at the expense of national
sovereignty and imposes a high cost on small, and not so small, creditors.
The beneficiaries do not include employees, business owners who
supply multinational companies, or tort victims. There is no reliable
evidence that even big, global lenders will benefit. Thus, the universalists
have difficulty in identifying an actual creditor that will realize a
demonstrable benefit. On the other hand, there is little difficulty in
identifying actual creditors will certainly be harmed.
So, exactly who wants universalism? The answer appears to be a
select group of professors, judges, and lawyers, who are regulars on the
international circuit. What binds them is a commitment to an
internationalized ideal, a shared vision of a cosmopolitan elite-an ideal
and vision that seems to have little concern for people who labor or grow
businesses. This is a club of worldly sophisticates, who disdain
territorialism and its perceived backwardness. Universalism is a badge of
cosmopolitan sophistication. 184 Framed this way, who can resist the siren
call to be part of the sophisticated, smart set? This may be the real, and
perhaps only, reason for universalism's success to date. However, is it too
much to ask that there be more to Chapter 15 than internationalism for its
own sake? "Flaunting a cosmopolitan sensibility may be quite chic, but this
high style comes with a price."' 85 And this cost is placed squarely on the
backs of the small participants who move their respective economies
forward.
184 Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 3, at 558.
185 Lund & McGinnis, supra note 177, at 1607.
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